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Near East/North Africa Report

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PLO MILITARY STRUCTURE, POSTURE DESCRIBED

Tel Aviv BAMAHANEH in Hebrew 8 Oct 80 pp 38-40

[Article by Hayim Raviv: "The Army of the Terrorists"]

[Text] The PLO's process of institutionalizing itself in Lebanon embraces also the military-terrorist sector and not only the political-economic area, as has already been discussed in previous articles. Within the PLO structure, a nucleus of a regular "national" army, alongside or in integration with the terrorist attack apparatuses, is being formed, and as such, the PLO will be able, in the event of the establishment of a Palestinian state, to field an army of about 20,000 men.

The PLO's military arm today constitutes a kind of military headquarters with a regular command structure. It consists of 15 directorates involved in matters of arms procurement, fuel, logistics, etc., and it has an operations headquarters staffed by officers for intelligence, artillery, and so forth. It is at this headquarters that the battle picture actually is formed. The headquarters absorbs current information and transmits the appropriate directives to the field forces by means of communications nets.

The military arm, under the command of Abu Jihad who is also responsible for the administration of the Western Sector, is divided into sector headquarters such as the headquarters of the Western Sector in the south, located in Sidon. This is the headquarters of the Kastal Brigade which consists of five regiments and supporting units and is commanded by an experienced military man, Haj 'Isma'il. This headquarters is responsible for the area between Beirut and Ra's Bayyadah, the Tyre enclave, and the coastal strip--the entire area between the Litani and the Zahrani and also the Nabatiyah region. It is also responsible for the terrorist forces which have penetrated the UNIFIL region in recent years and which now consist of about 600 men.

Another sector headquarters is the headquarters of the Karamah Brigade, located in Fatahland and responsible for the Fatahland region and Al Buq'ah.

These two brigades, Kastal and Karamah, are considered the advance force of the Fatah and a reserve for the headquarters of the Yarmuk Brigade deployed along the Fatahland. Another headquarters is located in the north, in the refugee camps of Nahr Al Barid and Al Baddawi, next to Tripoli. A terrorist concentration of about

500 men and commanded by a military man is located in this region. Another brigade, called the Ajandi Brigade, is located in the central region, in the region of Beirut. In general, Beirut serves as the focal point of the PLO activity. The headquarters, offices, directorate depots and the various kinds of training centers are located there.

Responsibility for the various sectors is concentrated in the Fatah which is the dominant force in the PLO. It is responsible for everything related to current security, and it actually makes the decisions in all areas of life of a regular army. The centrality of the Fatah in the area is expressed in the division of the regions of activity, the function of the forces, and in the delegation of authority. All the other organizations are subordinate to it and to the decisions of the Supreme Military Council, in which the Fatah sets the tone. The Fatah's degree of control in the PLO military establishment is evident from the fact that of the approximately 15,000 men in the PLO regular army structure, Fatah has 10,000.

In regard to the weapons available to the PLO forces in Lebanon, the terrorist organizations, primarily Fatah, have about 120 guns, most of which are 57 mm or 85 mm field guns. These forces are also equipped with various types of mortars and with towed recoilless guns transported on jeeps, in addition to personal weapons. The terrorist companies have all types of small trucks. The field guns are all concentrated in the structure of artillery regiments. Fatah has a number of such regiments, most of which are deployed in the Beirut region. The others are deployed in the Kastal and Karamah Sectors. The PLO forces also have tanks. The 'Ain Jalut Brigade is equipped with 60 T-34 tanks which were given to it this year by the Syrians. The equipping of the PLO forces with this weapon has great significance in that for the short term, it permits them to build a capability for coping with the local forces in Lebanon whereas for the long term it will permit them to build a military infrastructure consisting of a training system, arms procurement, and more advanced weapons.

Parenthetically, although the 'Ain Jalut Brigade, which is a part of the Palestine Liberation Army, constitutes a separate structure, it is subordinate to the Fatah. The rest of the units of this army, which total 3,000 men, are dispersed in Jordan and in Syria and are subordinate to the regular armies of those countries.

Infantry but Also Air and Naval Forces

The PLO forces have three sources of arms: weapons collected during the civil war in Lebanon, especially weapons of the Arab Lebanese Army. This army, whose men deserted the traditional Lebanese Army and joined the Fatah, is today completely subordinate to this organization. It consists of about 1,000 men from the leftist forces in Lebanon. In joining the Fatah it brought with it a "dowry" which consisted of guns, trucks, and jeeps. The PLO's other sources of arms are the countries of the eastern bloc and Arab countries such as Libya, Iraq and Syria.

The PLO military has placed special emphasis on training and on vocational-technical training. The training exercises are generally conducted at the company level. The regiment is responsible for current security while the brigade is a kind of amorphous structure which is responsible organizationally for all of the regiments. The vocational-technical training is conducted at the headquarters level--up to the regimental and brigade levels.

In order for one to get a clear picture of the nature of the brigade in the PLO forces, we would explain that it is an organizational structure which has sector functions. The basic element in the Fatah structure, as is the case in the other terrorist organizations, is the regiment composed of three regular companies and an additional support company, with each company numbering about 70 men. The regiment is generally deployed in villages or tent camps, its headquarters is located in the village, its personnel are equipped with a variety of weapons, and it is connected to the communications systems.

Along with the effort to build and consolidate infantry forces, the PLO is also building naval and air structures. The PLO sends its personnel to study in naval academies in Arab and foreign armies. Some of them have already been trained in Egypt and some of them are still in training in Iraq, Pakistan, and countries of the eastern bloc. Their training includes naval commando exercises. In regard to the air structure, the PLO, read: Fatah, has about 100 technicians, engineers, and pilots who have acquired and are acquiring training primarily in countries of the eastern bloc, however also in Arab countries and other countries such as Uganda. These include many fighter and helicopter pilots. The building of this air system is not designed, of course, to serve the immediate objectives. Its primary objective is for the long term--to create an air force which will be the nucleus for the air force of the future Palestinian state. In the meantime, the Palestinian pilots today are integrated into the squadrons of the regular Arab armies.

The total number of Palestinians taking advanced training for the PLO in various countries comes to several hundred every year, and the training is both in the technical and the command areas. The graduates of the courses who return to the PLO ranks are assigned to the training of new conscripts, and they pass on their information to those around them.

One of the most difficult problems with which the PLO leadership is grappling today is that of conscripting manpower for the regular army forces. The ranks of this army have dwindled both as a result of the battles with enemy forces within Lebanon and the constant military pressure which the IDF is applying against the PLO forces in this country, which weakens, of course, the motivation of the Palestinians to enlist. Within the framework of its efforts to fill the vacuum which has been created in the ranks of the terrorists, the PLO is trying to institute a draft among the Palestinians who are living in various Arab countries. This means the creation of a situation in which it will be able to compel a Palestinian residing in Kuwait, for example, to join the PLO forces.

Manpower Shortage in the PLO

This problem became so acute that 'Arafat himself found it necessary to intervene personally for the purpose of finding a solution. During his trip last month to several Arab countries where there are Palestinian populations, he tried to influence their leaders to permit him to work for the mobilization of Palestinian manpower for the PLO forces. However, these leaders are not inclined to respond to the PLO leader's appeal in this matter, and this is in view of the two-faced attitude which the PLO displays toward those countries and the air of suspicion prevalent between them. For example, the Syrians are suspicious that the PLO-Fatah maintains "close ties" with the Moslem Brotherhood organization which is working for the overthrow of the Asad regime in Syria.

The manpower shortage afflicting the PLO is also expressed in 'Arafat's call to the students of Europe to join the terrorist organizations for one-half year. In Lebanon itself, the PLO has set up an office to register enlistees from among the students, however, the response has apparently been poor. Those students who join the PLO do this for the purpose of funding their studies in the Arab University in Beirut. In general, these students are assigned to headquarters administrative functions.

The main manpower reservoir of the regular PLO forces is concentrated, therefore, in the refugee camps in Lebanon. The conscriptees from these camps are for the most part common people, uneducated, and with no suitable livelihood. They are assigned primarily to the field units. As for the conscriptees from the educated class, their percentage is low and they avoid the field units and prefer to serve primarily in the administrative level. The combatants are primarily bachelors. Those in the senior ranks--the regimental and brigade commanders and the administrative personnel--are mostly married men who consider their employment as their destiny in life. Incidentally, a significant number of them were officers in the Jordanian army who crossed over to Lebanon as a result of the "Black September" events in 1970. Alongside the regular military forces are the militia structures which operate in the refugee camps and in other concentrations in Lebanon. Their personnel undergo from 2 weeks to 1 month of training, primarily in weapons and sabotage, and they listen to doctrinaire speeches on the "Palestinian Revolution." They are concentrated on a sector basis and fulfill the function of a civil guard for the defense of the camps. Every camp has a local militia commander, and there is also a general commander of the militias who resides in Beirut. These structures constitute a kind of reserve for the PLO regular army.

Corruption in the Political and Military Hierarchy

The PLO in Beirut has an adjutancy directorate which is involved in various areas of service conditions, care for the families of casualties, training, and advanced training and also a judicial system concerned with discipline and punishment of offenders. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the heads of the PLO scrupulously maintain a strong discipline among their soldiers. They are warned not to offend the local population, and since they are aware of their status as undesirable guests, they try to gain public approval of their presence and activity. The PLO military police, called the "Armed Struggle," takes measures to prevent friction with the local population, and in cases of intrigue on the part of PLO people, they punish and jail those involved. Moreover, the heads of the PLO make an effort to assist the local population in services such as electrical repairs because of shellings and so forth.

However, despite the efforts of the PLO leadership to coexist with the local population, there are many cases in which the presence of the terrorists arouses the anger of the local residents. Recently this occurred in northern Lebanon, in the Ash Shuf region. The residents of this region are openly expressing their concern about the danger that the presence of the terrorist organizations in their region will lead to a deterioration in the security situation, read--to IDF reactions as has occurred in the southern part of the country.

Graphic evidence of the PLO's process of institutionalization can be found in the spread of cases of economic and ethical corruption among the political and military hierarchy. For example, it is known that there is budget inflation in the PLO with the approval of 'Arafat himself--for the purpose of personal ostentatious expenses and the assurance of a high standard of living for the heads of the organization. Conspicuous in this context is the case of the purchase of luxurious apartments for PLO people in prestigious areas of Beirut. Criticism of these revelations is being heard from the residents in the areas.

There are many instances of PLO military personnel being observed as guests in nightclubs and other places of entertainment in Beirut. Nevertheless, the general impression is that all these instances cannot undermine the status of the PLO leader in the eyes of the general Palestinian public or make it significantly more difficult for him to control the forces subordinate to him.

Of course, this entire process of institutionalization does not detract from the PLO's character as a terrorist organization. The building of military structures is only one side of the coin. The other side represents terrorist attack apparatuses. Each of the terrorist organizations which belong to the PLO also maintains, alongside the military structure, structures for attack and sabotage objectives. In this area, each organization has its own independent apparatuses, and it zealously guards its freedom of action in everything related to conscription, collaboration with other organizations, selection of target, methods of attack, and so forth.

"Western Sector Administration"

The Fatah, which as was stated is the main organization in the PLO, has a Western Sector Administration which is involved with attacks in the territory of Israel. This administration operated initially from Jordan, and because of its location, it was given this name at that time. The Western Sector Administration, the offices of which are located in Beirut and Damascus, consists of six action committees which operate on a territorial basis: The Jerusalem Committee, the Hebron Committee, the Gaza Committee, the Shekhem Committee, the Galilee Committee, and the Janin Committee. Each committee operates in the territory for which it is responsible to locate conscripts, to infiltrate arms, and so forth. Each committee is headed by an activist who is a native of that region. So, for example, the chairman of the Hebron Committee, Abu Safed, who was killed in 1975, was a native of Hebron, and the chairman of the Jerusalem Committee, Abu Siras, was from Jerusalem. These committees conscript personnel from the territories by means of students who go there on summer vacation or through other contacts. They give them training in Lebanon or Syria and assign them attack missions, each one in the area for which he is responsible. The infiltration of the territories is via the bridges or the sea, in the Gaza Strip, or across the Egyptian border. As such, for example, there was recently an attempt to infiltrate personnel and arms into the Gaza Strip in order to carry out attacks in the territory between the Strip and Tel Aviv. There are also attempts to infiltrate across the Jordan border with the aid of the secret military infrastructure of the Western Sector Headquarters in this country. Incidentally, this infrastructure operates under the guise of a social-humanitarian organization, and it functions with the approval of King Husayn. It is this infrastructure that trained and supplied for many months the murder team in Hebron with instructions, financial aid, and explosives.

Similar apparatuses, on a much smaller scale, exist in each of the other Palestinian organizations. However, just as the Fatah is the main element in the military sector it has the same status in the terrorist actions against Israel. This is perhaps the place to point out the operating characteristics of the various organizations other than the Fatah.

*The Democratic Front, headed by Na'if Hawatmah. This Front operates primarily in two areas: Attacks within the territories and within the green line and attempts to infiltrate and attack across the Lebanese border. The organization has about 10 small 100-man regiments, which, except for their dimensions, are similar in composition to the Fatah regiments.

*The Popular Front, headed by George Habash. This organization maintains about six small infantry regiments in Lebanon. In spite of its declarations of its intentions to carry out attacks abroad, it has been conspicuous recently for its attacks in southern Lebanon. Most of the military actions in this region, and especially in the Nabatiyah region, have been carried out by Habash's Popular Front in collaboration with Lebanese leftist elements.

*The Front of Ahmad Jibril. This organization which absorbed a severe beating in the civil war in Lebanon is a small one. Twenty to 30 of its people are deployed in each sector. They have recently improved the effectiveness of their actions, and they are known for launching sophisticated attacks, suicide attacks, etc. Their attention to the military sphere is low in comparison to the effort which they devote to the terrorist attacks sphere. They recently attempted to launch an attack across the Jordanian border, and their attempt to attack an El Al office in Sweden failed.

*The Arab Liberation Front, which consists of several hundred terrorists and is located primarily in the Qasimiyah region. This organization, which is subordinate to the Iraqi authorities and conducts its system of attacks in coordination with them, emphasizes attacks within the territory of Israel. This is the organization which attacked Misgav 'Am.

*The Abu 'Abbas faction is a group which split off from Ahmad Jibril's organization. It has about 400 men. It is a clearly terrorist organization which recently attempted to attack by means of a balloon on the Lebanese border.

Another terrorist system which is part of the PLO consists of a number of groups involved in attacks abroad. Among these are:

*Force 17, responsible for the personal safety of PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat and for carrying out special commando missions. This force was partially responsible for the wave of attacks which were carried out during April-May 1978 in the wake of the peace agreement, primarily in West Berlin.

*Black September, headed by Abu 'Iyad, which was responsible for the attacks during the period 1968-1974 and which has been involved in recent attacks.

*The Abu Al-Hul Force, Fatah's main intelligence organization. It is primarily involved in the collection of information on Israel, the Christians in Lebanon, and the Syrians, and also in countering intelligence espionage activities. It is also responsible for security of PLO representations throughout the world.

*The Al Sa'iqa organization which is controlled by the Syrian authorities. Three of its regiments are located in Lebanon. Most of the attacks abroad after the peace agreement were carried out by this organization, naturally in coordination with Syria.

The Fatah as the main component of the PLO at this stage has suspended its attacks abroad, however its infrastructure exists and is ready for action at any time. The other organizations, as was stated, are active.

Four Possible Scenarios

What is the future of the Palestinians in Lebanon? It is difficult of course to predict, however we will try to prognosticate with four scenarios:

In the event of a continuation of the current situation, and no change in the basic existing conditions: The PLO succeeds in consolidating for itself a major position of strength in Lebanon. It strengthens its status while maneuvering among the various Arab countries. It is aided by the leftist organizations in Lebanon while the building of the military structures continues.

Another scenario: The Syrians leave Lebanon. In this event, we can expect the resumption of the civil war between the Palestinians and the Christians which is likely to result in a de facto partition of Lebanon into two main states--a Palestinian state, extending from the Beirut line to the southern Lebanon region, and a Christian state in the Lebanese mountains.

Scenario three: The establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. In this case, the terrorists' base in Lebanon is likely to disintegrate.

Scenario four: The IDF finds itself compelled to launch an occupation campaign on a much larger scale than that of the Litani operation. In this case, the PLO is likely to be pushed into a neighboring Arab country such as Syria. Its military posture and maneuverability will be significantly weakened, and it will be under the strong control of the Syrians.

Beyond all of this, one cannot ignore the fact that the Palestinians in Lebanon have become an important political factor who have something to say about every future internal development. This PLO achievement is attributed, of course, to the military strength which it has built and is building in Lebanon and to the fact that the PLO during the course of years has changed from a group of terrorists hiding in caves to an institutionalized system of a developing army with the ingredients of a state in formation.

5830
CSO: 4805

WEST BANK MAYOR OUTLINES EXPECTED EUROPEAN INITIATIVE

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 11 Nov 80 p 21

[Article: "Dispatch from Amman: Ilyas Farij, Mayor of Bethlehem Tells AL-QABAS: 'Gaston Thorn Told West Bank Leaders That There Would Be a New European Initiative Before the End of the Year' "]

[Text] Mr Ilyas Farij, mayor of Bethlehem revealed for the first time the occupation authorities' intention to prevent the entry of the Jordanian-Palestinian Committee's support funds to the municipalities and the national organizations of the West Bank. Any municipality or organization that wishes to bring in funds from abroad has to provide evidence of the source of the funds. Otherwise, the funds will be confiscated.

In an interview with AL-QABAS Mr Farij said, "This measure is part of a Zionist plan whose objective is to let our people starve and force them to emigrate from their land."

Mr Farij added, "As a result of this recent Zionist measure, most West Bank municipalities are now suffering from a major financial deficit. One of these municipalities in particular is that of Bethlehem. If this financial deficit is not remedied, the municipality of Bethlehem will have to suspend its services and discharge all its employees and workers in the next few weeks."

He said that the municipality was having a monthly deficit of 8,000 Jordanian dinars. This is in addition to the deteriorating economic condition that is due to the rise in the cost of living, the decline in the purchasing power of the currency in the occupied Arab lands and the increasing taxation of individuals and organizations.

Mr Farij mentioned that the funds that are available to the municipality are not more than 29,000 Jordanian dinars and that Arab aid in 1979 and 1980 did not exceed 52,000 dinars even though the municipality needs 100,000 dinars every year to perform its services in an acceptable manner.

He said that we needed to provide about 4 million Jordanian dinars to cover the expenses of Bethlehem's projects for housing, schools, paving roads and for other projects as well.

He emphasized that Arab aid should afford this matter the interest and care [that are required] because providing services and [building] a foundation for any project were important tasks that must be given priority.

The Leader of the British Liberal Party

Regarding his recent meeting with the leader of the British Liberal party Mr Farij said, "The idea that the leader of the British Liberal party has for a solution to the Palestinian problem does not differ from the ideas that Mr Gaston Thorn, Luxembourg's minister of foreign affairs, has for a just and permanent solution that is based on the Israeli withdrawal, the right to self-determination for the Arab people of Palestine and allowing the PLO to participate in the peace talks."

Mr Farij said that the leader of the British Liberal party was pleased with the results of his negotiations with Mr Yasir 'Arafat during his recent visit to Damascus.

Meeting with Luxembourg's Minister of Foreign Affairs

Regarding the meeting he had with Mr Gaston Thorn, Luxembourg's minister of foreign affairs and present chairman of the current session of the European Common Market, during Mr Thorn's recent visit to the occupied West Bank, Mr Farij said, "Mr Thorn assured Palestinian leaders on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip about Europe's position vis a vis the question of achieving a just peace in the area--a peace that is based on the full Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab land, on granting the Palestinian people the right to determine their own destiny and on allowing the PLO to participate in the peace talks as the legitimate and the only representative of the Arab people of Palestine."

Mr Farij said that Mr Thorn had informed the Palestinian leaders with whom he had met that Europe condemned the Israeli settler policy on the occupied Arab lands. Mr Thorn informed the Palestinian leaders about the European position on the Camp David accords which are considered an impractical step for achieving peace in the area. He also told them that the European community considered the law to annex Jerusalem to be illegal.

During his visit to the occupied West Bank, Mr Thorn extended an invitation to Mr Farij to visit Luxembourg. In addition to meeting with Mr Farij, Mr Thorn also met Messrs Rashad al-Shawa, Hilmi Hanun, Zafir al-Masri, Ibrahim al-Tawil, Anwar Nasibah, Hikmat al-Masri, 'Awni al-Saghir and Fayiz Abu Rahmah. All of them are important men of the West Bank.

New European Initiative

Mr Parij said that Mr Thorn had informed the representatives of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that a new European initiative would be launched at a meeting before the end of this year to revaluate the situation in accordance with the ideas that Mr Thorn had formulated during his recent tour of the area.

At the end of the interview Mr Parij called for more Arab support and aid to the municipalities and all the national organisations of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip so as to strengthen and encourage them to resist the policy of aggression.

8592
CSO: 4802

AIRLINES TECHNICAL AGREEMENT SIGNED

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 3 Dec 80 p 2

[Text]

JEDDAH, Dec. 2 (SPA) — Sheikh Ahmad Matar, Saudia's chairman of the board, returned here from Bahrain Monday after signing a technical pool agreement among Saudia, Kuwait Airways, Alia (Royal Jordanian), Middle East Air Liban and Gulf Air.

A Saudia spokesman said the aim of the agreement is to achieve technical integration and self-sufficiency among the five companies. Under the agreement, the firms will coordinate various maintenance operations involving the planes' engines, bodies, precision work and telecommunications equipment. It also covers other types of ground technical services and the exchange of spare-parts. Each of the five companies will have a limited responsibility in these fields, but Saudia will be in charge of the repair and maintenance of the bodies of the five companies' aircraft. The agreement will go into effect in 1985.

The spokesman said the agreement will extend in future to specifications of planes to be bought and the type of engines to be purchased so as to obtain the best technical and price advantages.

He also said that an agreement was signed last Saturday in Manama, Bahrain, to set up a Joint Computerized Reservation Center for the five companies. The center will soon go into operation in Bahrain.

CSO: 4820

INCREASE IN NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION FORESEEN

Kabul HEYWAD in Dari 15-16 Oct 80 p 3

[Text] By drilling three new exploratory wells through the Jurassic system in the Jar Qoduq gas fields, total annual extractable gas of the field will be increased annually by 2 billion cubic meters.

In making the announcement, a source in Afghanistan's National Oil Company of the Ministry of Mines and Industries also said that research and exploratory work on the reserve in the above-mentioned field had been completed in 1352 [21 Mar 73-20 Mar 74] by the drilling of 13 research and 11 exploratory wells, establishing a reserve of some 24 billion cubic meters of gas in the field's getrif [sic-granitic] layer.

It must be noted that a number of exploratory wells had been drilled through the field's Jurassic system with good results.

The source further added that studies based on research carried out to determine the reserve of the Jar Qoduq gas field, indicate that the amount of gas in the getrif [sic] layer of the ground is possibly much more (than had been expected) and that gas also existed in the Jurassic system of the field.

Regarding various stages of research and exploratory work carried out in the Jar Qoduq gas fields, the source made the following points: exploration and studies to determine gas reserves of the Jar Qoduq field began in 1340 [21 Mar 61-20 Mar 62] under the agreement signed between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union and was carried out by experts from the two countries with financial and technical help of the Soviet Union. The first well was drilled in 1349 [21 Mar 69-20 Mar 70], to the depth of 2368 meters, penetrating the getrif [sic] layer and proving the existence of gas in the area.

Following the discovery of the above-mentioned reserve, the Ministry of Mines and Industries, assisted by Afghan and Soviet technical experts, began to study and evaluate the possibility of exploiting the reserve. In order to achieve the goal of how to best use the reserve for the benefit of strengthening the country's economy, further studies concerning the gas reserve was necessary so that economic standards could be determined and appropriate decisions about the development of the field made.

A complete report of surveys and technical and economic studies that had been made was analyzed by related Soviet institutions by using a Soviet long-term credit. After the project was proved economically feasible, it entered into the exploitation stage.

On the exploitation stage, the source said that it was divided into two separate following operations:

1. Reaching the gas by drilling the required wells so that it could be brought to the surface and exploited.

2. Preparing the gas for use by public consumers and various plants.

The carrying out of these two operations requires full knowledge about the amount of the extractable gas and its physical and chemical qualities that have been collected previously but must be completed.

Preparing a plan aimed at carrying out the above-mentioned operations had been completed by related Soviet institutions using financial and technical assistance provided by that country and was later submitted to Afghan authorities.

According to the source, the first stage in the exploitation of the gas reserve which included that of drilling and completing work on a total of 27 wells through the getrif [sic] layer to the depth of 2250 meters was left to the National Oil Company of Afghanistan.

Under the terms of an economic and technical assistance agreement, signed 3 years ago between the oil company and the Soviet Technoexport Institute, the oil and gas exploration department was provided with various machineries, drilling equipment and Soviet technical experts, using a long term Soviet credit. As a result, 19 wells were drilled during the first stage, followed by 12 more which were completed through cooperation by experts, workers and engineers of both nations and were put into use.

Four more drillings are underway at this moment, bringing the total operation wells during the second stage of the project to 27 which are expected to be completed and put into operation during the Second Five-Year Plan.

9561
CSO: 4903

DECREES ISSUED GRANTING ALLOWANCES TO MILITARY PERSONNEL

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE] in Arabic No 43, 23 Oct 80 pp 1825-28

[Article: "Decrees No 510, 511 of 1980 by President of the Republic of Egypt"]

[Text] Decree No 510 of 1980 by President of the Arab Republic of Egypt concerning allowances for navy and border guard officers serving on surface combat and support ships:

The President of the Republic,

After perusing the constitution, law No 232 of 1959 concerning the service and promotion requirements for the officers of the armed forces, law No 234 of 1959 concerning the requirements for the honor and support officers, noncommissioned officers and troops of the armed forces, law No 30 of 1967 on deduction from allowances, additional wages and rewards given to military and civilian personnel, law No 90 issuing the retirement, insurance and pension law for the armed forces personnel, decree No 2031 of 1969 by the president of the Arab Republic of Egypt on payment of the additional allowances stipulated for the officers, noncommissioned officers and troops of the armed forces, decree No 287 of 1979 by the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt on the compensations given to the armed forces officers, noncommissioned officers and troops;

And after perusing proposal of the Armed Forces Officers Committee and the recommendation of the minister of defense and war production;

Has decided:

Article one, the following allowance shall be paid to the naval officers and border guard officers serving on surface combat and support ships operating within the combat units of the naval forces and of the border guard naval force with the approval of the Naval Forces Operations Branch:

Seven pounds monthly for the rank of colonel and above.
Six pounds monthly for the ranks of lieutenant colonel and major.
Five pounds monthly for the ranks of captain, first lieutenant and lieute... c.

Article two, the deduction stipulated by the abovementioned law No 30 of 1967 shall apply to this allowance.

Article three, the minister of defense and war production shall issue the executive orders regulating the dispensation rules and conditions.

Article four, this decree shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall go into force as of 1 October 1980.

Anwar al-Sadat

Decree No 511 of 1980 by the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt granting hazardous work allowance to paratroop officers, shock troop officers and frogmen officers of the armed forces:

The President of the Republic,

After perusing the constitution, law no 232 of 1959 concerning the service and promotion requirements for the officers of the armed forces, law No 234 of 1959 concerning the requirements for the reserve officers' service in the armed forces, law No 87 of 1960 on general mobilization, law No 106 of 1964 on the service and promotion requirements for the honor and support officers, noncommissioned officers and troops of the armed forces, law No 30 of 1967 on deductions from the allowances, additional wages and rewards given to military and civilian personnel, decree No 252 of 1979 granting a hazardous pay allowance to some special officers, noncommissioned officers and troops of the armed forces;

And after perusing proposal of the Armed Forces Officers Committee and the recommendation of the minister of defense and war production,

Has decided:

Article one, a hazardous work allowance shall be paid to the paratroop officers, shock troop officers and frogmen officers at a rate of 12 pounds monthly.

This allowance shall be paid at the rate of 8 pounds monthly for those who are entitled to it in case they are transferred--before or after this decree goes into force--from a unit entitled to the allowance in accordance with the allowance dispensation conditions and rules.

Article two, this allowance may not be combined with the hazardous work allowance stipulated by the abovementioned decree No 252 of 1979 by the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

Article three, this allowance shall be subject to the deduction stipulated in the abovementioned law No 30 of 1967.

Article four, the minister of defense and war production shall issue the executive orders regulating the dispensation rules and conditions.

Article five, this decree shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall go into force as of 1 October 1980.

Issued at the presidential office on 4 October 1908.

Anwar al-Sadat

8494
CSO: 4802

REAGAN PRESENTED AS 'SAME CARTER IN ANOTHER GUISE'

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 8 Nov 80 pp 1, 2

[Text] Finally, a new chief has replaced the old one. Carter is gone and Reagan has arrived. There are lots of talks about the new one. They say that the new one drops bombs as if they were pebbles, and that bullets, shells and mortar shells rain out of his sleeves.

The fact is that these talks are of the same type that are originally designed to create fear and, as the Imam has said, are the instruments by the use of which superpowers try to frighten and cow people in order to dominate them. The changes of kingpins and the propaganda are all aimed to show the world that imperialism knows not one, two, three but thousands of tricks, and is standing ready to use whichever is found to be most suitable for their purposes.

What is interesting, is the defeat of Carter, which had been foreseen by the Imam in definite terms months in advance. This is more surprising because, while the U.S., with all those organizations and experts and, recently, Islamic scholars, had not been able to predict the trends in Iran's policy, the leader of the Islamic Revolution, who is a simple theologian, had been able to predict the outcome of the American elections months in advance and declare in precise and calculated terms that: "Carter should forget about the presidency. I give my word that he will not be elected this time." No doubt, the ability to so correctly forecase future trends and events, which had been done in various other cases, emanates from the Imam's deep knowledge and understanding of the world's moral and material affairs.

Anyway, the important fact, as far as we and other oppressed nations are concerned, is that the defeat of Carter has not changed anything basically. For the tormented nations in history, it does not matter which executioner has the whip. No doubt, the difference in methods of the expansionist imperialist powers could not be denied and, as the Imam has noted, they are carefully watching one another, like wolves who, even at nights, sleep facing each other out of fear. Yet, their differences are not in whether to exploit, oppress and enslave or not. They are different only as far as their methods of operation are concerned.

If Carter cut throats with cotton, Reagan will do it with a sword. Yet, the result is going to be the same. They both cut and take the head, too. The important fact is that the American policy is not something that is determined by an individual or even a group. It is determined by mutual understanding among the world's big capitalists, cartels and trusts, influenced by what is inherent in imperialism.

The election of Reagan is not because he had outstanding individual qualities. His election only represents the victory of another "plundering" wing with a different method for plundering and suppression. In fact, Reagan is better for us because he does not hold a new trick for us up in his sleeves the way his predecessors such as Nixon, Ford and Johnson did. He cannot do something worse than was done in Vietnam. It will not be more dangerous and savage than is in South Lebanon or in Palestine. It could not be more bloody than in Chile, Tel Zo'eiter or the 15 Khordad [5 June 42, the first disturbances caused by Khomeyni followers in Tehran]. Imperialism no longer has a plot that has not been bared before. If there is to be anything new, it is only in its details. Therefore, what Reagan, as a symbol of the rule of "other methods and groups", has up his sleeves that his predecessor did not have? Incidentally, it was previous violent methods and policy which forced American imperialism to retract and make it adopt Carter's Human Rights policy. If they are forced to once again go back to the old policy and use the same methods, they are free to do it, but it will be very costly this time. The day will finally come when imperialism will dig its own grave.

9561
CSO: 4906

KURDISH STUDIES IN USSR REVIEWED

Huddinge ROJA NU in Turkish Oct-Nov 80 p 5

[Text] Studies of Kurdish history have been ensured great progress from the standpoint of quantity and quality in the Soviet Union. Kurdish history, dealt with from a dialectic approach, has been greatly enlightened on a broad scale. The number of studies undertaken has been extremely large. Nationalist movements in the four parts of Kurdistan are being examined from various viewpoints and are a subject for research. In recent years, the study of Iraqi Kurdistan, in particular, has gained specific intensity.

We have come across the valuable works of M. S. Lazaref, Celile Celil, and N. A. Halfin on 19th-century Kurdistan. Of these, Lazaref has made two large studies of the history of Kurdistan since the French Revolution. With his 1963 work entitled, "The Kurdish Question," and his 1972 publication, "The Kurdish Problem from 1891-1917," Lazaref has greatly supplemented studies in the area of Kurdistan's history. Lazaref discusses the Kurdish nationalist movements by separating them into three chronological periods -- the feudal period, the bourgeois-nationalist period, and the revolutionary-democrat or contemporary period. Celil is a Kurd and currently works in Armenia. Celil is a specialist in the area of Kurdish history and, in 1966, published a book entitled, "The Kurds' 1880 Uprising," which describes the Ubeydullah movement. Later, the author conducted another study of thetopic, "Kurds within the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the 19th century." This study was published in book form in 1972.

Halfin is another historian who continues to do research on 19th-century Kurdistan. In 1963, Halfin made a study entitled, "The Battle for Kurdistan." In 1978, he completed a great book, "Russia's Foreign Policy from the End of the 18th Century to the Beginning of the 20th Century." In this most recent work of Halfin, Kurdish-Russian relations as tied in with the Russians' Caucasus policy are discussed. Of these authors, Lazaref is currently working on a study of the Kurdish problem during the period of World War I and World War II.

Distinguished studies of the Kurdish people's movement taking place in Iraq have been conducted in the Soviet Union. The economic structure of Iraqi Kurdistan, the Iraqi Baath administration's policy regarding the Kurds, the work of the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party, the characteristics of the nationalist movement, and the international situation have been handled as a whole, and, in this way, the problem has been gone into in depth through these studies. Most of these studies have been defended as theses at universities, and most have been published as books. Some are:

1. Kaitan, N. "The Barzani Uprising -- The Sparkling Pages of the Kurdish People's Struggle for National Salvation in Iraqi Kurdistan," Leningrad, 1963.

2. Kemal, M. A. "The Nationalist Freedom Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan during the Period from 1918-1958," Moscow, 1969.

3. Mentesashvili, "The History of the Kurdish People's Salvation Movement in Iraq from 1919-1925," Tiflis, 1956.

4. Sago, F. D. "The Right of Peoples to Determine Their Own Destinies and the Validity of the Kurdish People's Position in Iraq," Kiev, 1972.

5. Mayrakov, M. A. "The Characteristics of the Economic and Geographic Structure of Iraqi Kurdistan," Minsk, 1972.

6. Seytullah, T. T. "The Nationalist Freedom Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan," Dagestan, 1944.

7. Xudo, Sekroe "The Problem of the Kurdish People's Autonomy in the Republic of Iraq," Yerevan, 1977.

Of these authors, Xudo works in the Kurdish studies department of the Armenia Eastern Studies Institute. He is a scholar with expert knowledge of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Throughout history, reactionary Turkish, Iranian, and Iraqi powers have expended a great deal of effort to weaken the Kurdish nationalist movement and to cause it to deviate from its purpose. They have continuously pitted Kurds against other suppressed peoples living in the region. We see that the reactionary sovereign powers chose this course as a means to extricate themselves from the crises and difficult situations into which they had fallen. For this reason, they struggled desperately to create an atmosphere that would lead to Kurdish-Armenian and Kurdish-Assyrian clashes. This is how Kurdish historical relations with their neighboring peoples became the topic of a great deal of research in the Soviet Union. Karlane Cacan, K. P. Matveev, and Lazaref made several studies in this area. Cacan is a Kurd and is working at the Armenia Kurdish Studies Institute. In

1965, Cacan did a study entitled, "The History of Kurdish and Armenian Friendship." He is now working on two different topics, "Kurds in Armenian Periodicals," and "The Brave Struggle of the Armenian and Kurdish People in Dersim." Assyrian-Kurdish relations had a large part in Matveev's 1979 work, "Assyrians in Our Time." The researcher speaks of, in particular, the Kurdish-Assyrian impasse in Iran and Kurdish-Assyrian solidarity in Iraq.

It is also necessary to mention the valuable studies of G. B. Akapov. Akapov has, to date, completed two great studies of Kurds. One, "Kurds and the Kurdish Question Based on Turkish Historical Sources," was published in 1970. The other, "Kurds in Iran -- One Viewpoint of the Problem of Nationalist Solidarity," is a study of Iranian Kurdistan. This work was published as a book in 1971 in Yerevan.

The studies of the history of Kurdistan conducted in the Soviet Union include topics that are much more restricted. For example, one of these was published in 1967 under the title, "The History of Contemporary Kurdish Literature." This study was made by Maruf Xaznadar, an Iraqi who is an expert in Kurdish studies. Xaznadar defended this research as his doctorate thesis.

As for the present, two studies of the recent and current history of Kurdistan are being prepared by a group of specialists in the Armenia Kurdish studies department.

11673
CSO: 4907

ISRAEL SEEKS LINK WITH COMMON MARKET

Tel Avivi HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Oct 80, p 9

[Article by Eliahu Salpeter: "The Spanish Threat"]

[Text] Israel and the European community have been at odds on political issues, particularly the Palestinian issue, but Israeli links with the community (the Common Market) in a free trade agreement recently became a success story. On this issue there is no disagreement among diplomats and senior officials in the Market hierarchy.

The dark cloud on the economic horizon is the joining of Spain with the community, which is expected by 1983. Israel fears that without appropriate arrangements, the free entry of Spanish agricultural products will deal a severe blow to the competitive ability of Israeli agricultural products (which are subject to limitations, in contrast to industrial products from Israel). Market directors say that the fear is not such a terrible one: general industry will benefit from the opening of the Spanish market, and as for agricultural products, Israel is not alone in this arena. There will also be a need to find a solution for the products of other Mediterranean countries, especially of Tunisia and Morocco, about whom France is concerned in Market disfussions. Since the policies of the Market with respect to the Mediterranean countries are global, there will be arrangements which will affect Israel as well.

But above all, it is clear to all in the Common Market that the basic reforms in the agricultural policies of the community, the urgency for which has been discussed for years, will be unavoidable upon the entry of Spain into the Market. This will be the case because the budgets of the community will be unable to bear the burden of subsidizing farmers according to the existing method, and there are those who estimate that the burden of subsidies will exceed an additional 2 billion dollars this year.

There is no doubt that there has been a dramatic shift in the trade balance, in favor of Israel, with the Common Market. According to Market officials, already in the first 2 months of the year, Israel moved from a deficit to a surplus in this balance. According to Israeli officials, in the first 6 months of the year there was still a deficit of 150 million dollars, in favor of the Common Market. For Israel, the term "import" has other definitions, it is said in the Market. But, in any case, it is clear that Israel has increased its exports to Market countries

by a substantial degree since it signed the agreement. Common Market people emphasize that Israel is the only Mediterranean country which has achieved such an improvement, and that there are Mediterranean countries whose trade balance with the Market has actually worsened. It is important that there has been not only a quantitative expansion of Israeli exports to the Market, but that the variety of exported products has also increased.

It may be assumed that these praises of Israeli successes are intended to balance the disappointment of Israel in that discussions of a revision of the agreement last year, Israel achieved no benefits in the area of export of agricultural products. In Market circles it is claimed that there were no political considerations behind this position, but that the Market is not prepared to give any added benefits to any country until negotiations with Spain are completed. Officials say: "We do not know what will happen to the common agricultural policies of the Market until the entry of Spain."

The renewed review of the Israeli agreement with the Market will be made in 1983, and there is no certainty that by that time the joining of Spain will be completed, or that the determination of a new common agricultural policy will be made. Israel would like the problem of its export of agricultural products to be part of the negotiations with Spain. Market officials say that this is impossible. The Market cannot negotiate with a third country the conditions of Spain's joining the Market, but the interests of Israel and other Mediterranean countries will be taken into account.

Spanish agricultural products compete in many areas with Israeli agricultural products, but in particular in substantial quantities of fruits and vegetables. For example, Spain produces about 2 million tons(!) of tomatoes per year. Spain cultivates about 3 million hectars of land for fruits and vegetables by irrigation--as compared to several tens of thousands of hectars in Israel. In citrus fruits, the Spanish quantity exceeds that of Israel by three times. An even more serious problem is the expansion of Spanish orchards prior to its joining the Market--about 90,000 hectars per year. This means that not only will Spanish fruits, which until now have entered the Market under limitations similar to those which Israel is subject to, enter after Spain joins the Market, without tax, but within a few years the additional Spanish fruit will equal all of Israel's export to the Common Market.

In fact, all of the limitations which the Market set to stop the flow of imports from Spain will now fall upon Israel and Morocco. In the case of Moroccan agriculture, the problem is not only economic, but highly political, and in the Market it is known that a severe blow to Moroccan agriculture can endanger the stability of the regime there. The Israeli figures on exports to the Common Market show a growth of 42 percent in dollar terms in the first half of 1980 as compared to the same period last year, while world exports for the same period grew by only 28 percent. Imports from the Market remained unchanged in dollar terms, while imports from the world grew by 15 percent (since there was a large increase in the price of imported oil, this means that the rest of the types of imports were reduced far beyond the reduction of the value of the dollar).

The greatest improvement in Israeli trade with the Common Market occurred in exports to Italy: this export more than doubled. Exports to France, Holland, and West Germany (which is today the most important customer in Europe) increased by 50 percent. The success of Israeli exports is especially impressive in the face of an economic slowdown in Europe, which has reduced the demand for imports. Even though there has been a severe crisis in the textile branch in several Market countries, textile exports--especially of fashion products--from Israel grew by 40 percent.

The growth of exports to the Market reflects clearly the reduction of demand in Israel. When it is difficult to sell domestically, the producer turns to foreign markets--and thanks to his efforts and the quality of the merchandise, he is generally successful.

What has recently occurred once again proves that in spite of the recession in Europe, there are almost unlimited possibilities for Israeli exports, for we are speaking of relatively small quantities in a rich and large market. Progress has occurred in both industrial and agricultural exports, but as was noted, agricultural exports may face serious difficulties when Spain joins the Market. On the other hand, this joining will open up possibilities for Israeli industrial exports to this market, which today is not particularly open to Israel. Officials of the Common Market note: "Israeli industrialists are already in Spain and making contacts for the time when the limitations on Israeli exports will be removed."

Less impressive results of Israeli links to the Common Market are seen in the areas of collaboration in research, development, and production. Several symposia have been held, and several delegations have been exchanged, but the results have not been impressive, because there has been no budget for making serious initiatives. The Market directorate has tried to make special allocations for this purpose, but the council of finance ministers of the member countries has not authorized the request.

The financial protocol between Israel and the Market, which gave Israel access to the Bank for Industrial Development, is up for renewal in October 1981. The present protocol granted Israel loans amounting to 30 million "computed units" (about 35 million dollars, but arrangements are only just being completed for the drawing of the first 15 million. The Common Market people are persuaded that Israel will use up the balance before the end of the period.

While Israel believes that political considerations do not make easy any progress in the economic and technical spheres, Market circles believe that it is Israel which is influenced by political considerations: recently there was a feeling that Israel had become more embittered, stubborn, and aggressive in negotiations with the community, according to Market circles in Brussels.

[Policies of the Ostrich]

[Text] The Iran-Iraq War has in no way changed the declared position of the Common Market, according to which the Israeli-Arab dispute is at the heart of the

Middle Eastern crisis, and that there is an urgent need to solve the Palestinian problem so as to prevent an explosion which will endanger the supply of oil to Europe. The Israeli position is that we are indeed witnessing a flaring war in the region, with oil installations being destroyed and millions of barrels of oil burning--and all of this has no connection to the Israeli-Arab dispute. This view is not accepted by the foreign ministers of the Common Market countries. For them, the Venice Declaration is still Torah from Mt Sinai, with respect to their Middle Eastern policies.

In response to Israeli claims, ministerial officials and diplomats involved in the political side of the Council of Ministers of the Market say that the Irani-Iraqi dispute will sooner or later be solved--they think sooner--but the Israeli-Arab dispute will persist as long as Israel refuses to recognize the legitimate national rights of the Palestinians, and continues to control the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The differences between the various countries are not especially significant. Not only do France and West Germany adhere to these principles, but also the other countries. Even Holland--whose senior officials say that they are guided by a deep concern for the future of Israel, a concern which appears genuine--holds to this line.

It is difficult to avoid the impression of the theater of the absurd when nine Market countries define the Iran-Iraq war, which endangers the flow of half the oil consumed by the West, as a "bilateral dispute", as a sort of internal matter between two countries, while settlements on the West Bank are considered to be a threat to the peace of the region.

The Market countries continue to believe that Iraq is gradually moving into the Western Camp, and they still claim that Soviet penetration of the Middle East is made possible because of the Israeli-Arab dispute. Foreign ministers of the Market countries still dream of the creation of a European-Muslim front against the USSR, following the invasion of Afghanistan. A month after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, there were no signs that Western Europe was ready for a reappraisal and surrender of these illusory hopes.

But this coloration does not only affect Israel. The Market does not want to face the facts in many spheres--because the reality requires action, and action means changes that cost money or that have domestic political ramifications with countries that are members of the Market. A typical example was the Belgian decision not to participate in the recent NATO maneuvers, claiming that it did not have the budget to finance the fuel for tanks and planes of it which were supposed to participate. But everyone knows that the decision stemmed from coalition considerations linked to the cabinet crisis in Belgium.

The anti-Israeli policies fit into the broader policies of Western Europe, according to which they can afford to "wink" at Washington because ultimately, the U.S. will have no choice but to defend Western Europe. On the one hand there is the talk, and real fear, that the strength of the U.S. is falling below that of the USSR; on the other hand, there is conduct (and an apparently almost mystical belief) that the American defender is the insurance, and it makes no difference what Europe does or does not do.

The foreign policy of the Market--towards the U.S. and the Middle East in general, and towards Israel in particular--is shaped to a great extent by the understanding which prevails between French President Valerie Giscard D'Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, whose electoral victory last month strengthened the Paris-Bonn axis. The two shape policy according to what is viewed as the interest of the Common Market, and not according to the interest of NATO. Economic considerations are put ahead of military considerations.

In Buressels there are starting to appear the first outlines of a "fortress Europe" based upon the rock of American power, but whose walls are built of economic "straw bricks." This approach, more than stemming from any profound philosophy, has its origin in the sense that domestic social needs require the giving of priority to economic problems. The place of expectations of gradual economic growth is taken by the mentality of a stubborn and protracted crisis. The pressures for erecting a system of protective tariffs increase and displace the struggle for liberalization of trade--the latter having been the official ideology of the Market since its inception.

According to official figures, the number of unemployed in the nine Market countries reached 7.1 million--the first time in Market history that the 7 million barrier was broken. This is an increase of 18 percent in the last year, and the economists here believe that the real figure of those without work is closer to 9 million. The gross national product rose by only 1.3 percent.

Forecasts for 1981, which were published in mid-October, are also rather chilling: the unemployment rate will rise by 0.8 percent, which means another million without work. The growth of the gross national product will fall to 0.5 percent. Productivity will rise by at least a percent, and the joint government deficit of the Market countries will be about 4 percent of the joint gross national product, as compared to 3.5 percent this year. The only bright spots in the forecast are an expected significant decline in the inflation rate, and a lesser reduction in the balance of payments deficit of all of the Market countries together.

The coming year will also be one of severe economic and social stress within the Market countries. The European steel industry is in a severe crisis, and it will be necessary to close a great number of less efficient plants, a step which will cause severe local unemployment crises. The textile and auto industries are also in trouble, and problems with the U.S. are expected in the matter of free trade in these two areas.

But the most difficult issue--and the severest internal dislocation--is expected in the joint agricultural policies of the Market countries. This policy is based on constant support for both Italian and French agriculture (the latter being the least efficient, but having the most political power). The great subsidies granted to agriculture have created enormous surpluses--especially of sugar, dairy products, and several types of meat, the storage and refrigeration of which cost the Market hundreds of millions of dollars per year--not to mention the burden of the subsidies themselves. Now things have reached their limit, and the Market has formulated a policy of drastic reform of the agricultural policies, so as to cut the subsidies on the one hand, and the surpluses on the other. Without these reforms, the Market budget would collapse.

But if and when the Market council authorizes the changes in the agricultural policy, it will cause a real economic and social revolution in the life of these countries, a revolution which could be accompanied by political shocks. In this atmosphere, there is no haste in Brussels to complete the arrangements linked to the basic decision to join Spain to the Market. And to an even lesser extent, there is no readiness to take into consideration the economic and political problems of Israel.

7075
CSO: 4805

STAND ON TERRITORIAL AGREEMENTS WITH EGYPT ANALYZED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Oct 80 pp 9, 10

[Article by Dr Yisrael Eldad: "New Linkage"]

[Text] The term linkage entered our political dictionary during the negotiations with Sadat. Then, and in all of his important appearances, beginning in the Knesset, Sadat demanded the strong link between the agreements in Sinai and the "solution of the Palestinian problem" which for Sadat means explicitly and for Carter almost explicitly a return to the 1967 borders; for Begin it means autonomy in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. But there is already an assymetry--for the autonomy proposal, even under Begin's conception, is temporary for only 5 years, while the withdrawal from Sinai is final.

If we ignore the psychological and non-political, or even anti-political and certainly anti-geopolitical reasons which enabled Begin to make the easy, bitter, and speedy concession over the Sinai; if we ignore the ugly suspicions that his intention was only to "enter history" as a peacemaker, to receive the Nobel Prize, etc--the only thing that remains is the assumption of "conception", and it is: Sinai to Egypt in exchange for Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip to Israel, or: a separate peace. When Sadat decided not to reject this deal, he explicitly raised the linkage between peace with Egypt and a solution to the Palestinian problem. His concession was to agree to "full autonomy" as a temporary settlement; and he left no shadow of a doubt that within the temporary settlement there would be no Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank or East Jerusalem, whether or not there would be a final settlement with Jordan. Moreover, the Israeli government was forced to admit that we had not sought a "separate peace." This meant that not being separate, it was tied to continued settlements. This meant linkage.

As far as Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weitzman were concerned, it may be assumed that they saw clearly and did not delude themselves, realizing that they had "bought" at the price of Sinai, peace with Egypt, and its non-intervention in our anticipated disputes to the north and east if we did not, as was demanded, return to the 1967 borders. As for Begin, it is possible that he did delude himself into thinking that this was a separate peace. But soon enough it was proven to him that he had made the mistake, especially because of what he had expended. And there were many opportunities to stop the processes of giving. In any case, the revolution in Iran on top of the cutting off of oil from there was sufficient to justify stopping the handing over of the oil fields.

Now there occurred two things which certainly justify the forging of a policy appropriate to events. The war in the Persian Gulf involving the use of the Gulf of Aqaba for military supply. Its use by the hostile alliance of Jordan and Iraq requires, if not the immediate closing of the Gulf to this type of supply, at least constant Israeli surveillance by air and land. But what shall we say about the closing of the Gulf when the Jordan bridges remain open for the regular supply from Judea and Samaria to Jordan, and from there--certainly to Iraq, of food and who knows what else.

Now we find among ourselves those people who preach "timing," that race which attires all opportunism in the clothing of "timing". Since they do not dare to oppose what appears to be correct, they ask: why now? And you have no better example of this than the Golan. Apparently, the legal and final joining of the Golan to Israel has security justification. There is no demographic argument there. Pay attention to the type of reasoning which has been developed: when it was a matter of Israeli sovereignty over all of Jerusalem, there were cries against it because of the "holiness" of the city to all religions. If it is "holiness" which prevents, why not impose our sovereignty over Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, which have no holiness (for Christianity and Islam)? Then they bring up demography. The Arab population is dense. If so, why not impose Israeli sovereignty over Golan? It is not holy to Islam, and there is no hostile Arab population. At this point timing enters the picture.

But is better timing possible, perhaps even the last timing before it is too late, since the signing of the treaty between Syria and the USSR? All of Carter's illusions about Assad melted with the signing of that treaty. We are sitting in the Golan, and settling there. And there is a kind of national consensus with regard to security, that we should not leave the Golan. What is the reason for the hesitancy in imposing our sovereignty over the Golan? Of using Afghanization on the hostile northern border in order to create a fact and speed up the settlement there, when so many are now reluctant to go there or invest in a place whose fate might be the same as that of Yamit?

Today, Sadat is openly engaged in talks on autonomy. His strategy is obvious, even if the tactics change. He will do nothing which could break up the "peace process" until he has regained control of the whole Sinai. April 1982 is the decisive time. In the meantime, he will continue the autonomy game, which Begin opened with the simultaneous king-queen gambit. It is not that Sadat has given up linkage. He is only a better player than Begin. He accepted half of the gambit, and now he will accept the other half, the full exposure of Israel on the south, and the pushing of all of the Israeli "pawns" into one corner, as well as the cornering of the "pilots" (when chess was invented, the knights were the chief combatants) and then he will counterattack, or perhaps only join an attack, or draw the majority of the Israeli army from the north and the east to the old international border.

Therefore, he is involved in the rapid implementation of autonomy. Because Sadat will not cause the negotiations to break down, he will not violate the agreement until he controls all of the Sinai. It may be assumed that the Begin government already understands the game, and therefore it is beginning to accelerate: to wind up the autonomy agreement means to extract what is possible from Sadat--and from

Carter. It is clear that Camp David and the autonomy were a deal of defeat and mistake. But assuming that Begin already realized how things were going and was trying to salvage what he can, it can only be said: now is the time to demand linkage. Meaning, we are beginning to realize autonomy as we see it: we are not withdrawing; we are continuing the settlements, our domestic and foreign security, our freedom of movement; we are creating facts and we are demanding your agreement, Mr Sadat, immediately. We are not leaving you the option of saying in April 1982: Israel has breached the agreement, so the peace is null and void. Therefore, without agreement on autonomy, we are going to stop the process of withdrawal, because we are not sure of how you are going to use the Sinai, of how you are going to use the air fields which we built, and of how we will be cornered in Eilat.

Of course this tactic is not according to the assumptions and desires of those of us are fundamentally opposed to the Camp David Agreement. But perhaps it fits the intentions and hopes of people like Arens and Yitzhaq Shamir--to salvage from the political failure whatever is possible. But also according to Begin's assumptions, if he wants to prove at this late hour that he is not an absolute fool nor that he is not an intentional traitor, and that he is not intentionally imposing on Israel a defeat and countless casualties, in that Israel would have to fight from a narrow position on all sides, then only this remains for him to do: immediate full sovereignty over the Golan (with the hope that Haim Korfo, on instructions from the U.S., will not overcome Begin); open massive settlement of Judea and Samaria, so that his "autonomy" will not become a Palestinization.

This will be a test of Sadat's intentions with respect to peace, while we still hold half of the Sinai. Just as Sadat did nothing following the Jerusalem legislation, except to protest, so it may be assumed that he will not react to the total Judaizing of Judea and Samaria, certainly not now. If he does take action, it will be a sign regarding his intentions after he recovers the Sinai. If that is the case, it is better for it to happen while we are still in the Sinai.

Perhaps this is what Mr Dayan meant when he spoke of unilaterally implementing the autonomy. But when he does not link this to stopping the complete evacuation of the Sinai, in order to receive full assurances from Sadat of the autonomy a la Begin, then it is nothing but giving the trump card to the most dangerous enemy of Israel: Anwar Sadat.

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SETTLEMENT POLICIES IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES EXAMINED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 12 Oct 80 pp 37-42

[Article by Mahmud al-Qarut: "Israeli Settlements: Military Belt and Economic Solution"]

[Text] Hardly a day passes in the Middle East without the media carrying reports that a new settlement has been founded in the occupied Arab territories. The Israeli authorities continue to issue laws and decisions to "control" the settlers and to make them move within the framework of the plan drawn up to surround Israel by "alternate occupation" areas which, in case an agreement is reached on self-rule, will become the instrument of these authorities if they are compelled to withdraw their troops from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The settlements are a neo-old story which started with the creation of the Zionist entity and its settlement in the Arab territories by war and which have developed into a security plan to protect this entity in "peace."

The ruling Arab circles are talking these days about the dilemma of the Camp David talks and about the abysmal failure reached by Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in the self-rule negotiations. These circles believe that the intransigence and inflexibility of the Israelis, especially of Prime Minister Menachem Begin, are the reason behind the failure of these talks. These circles also expect that the ouster of the "hawks" and the assumption of power by the "doves" will lead to the resumption of the negotiations and the establishment of lasting peace in the area.

As usual, the Arabs forget quickly, especially matters pertaining to the fateful issues and to complex political issues.

It is well known that the so-called doves ruled Israel for 30 years from the time it was created, that they waged four wars against the Arabs, that they usurped Palestine and that they killed and displaced hundreds of thousands of Arabs. Yet, the Arabs are still making a losing wager today, namely that these doves can establish peace in our area.

We must pause before an important aspect. Israel which has produced the men of war and of aggression, such as Ben Gurion, Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir and others, is incapable, as a result of the principles and goals of its creation and existence, of producing a man of peace who negotiates with his neighbors to settle the

Palestinian issue. This inability is due to the absence of the Israeli political decision calling for peace.

This is where the significance of the political decision in Israel--and the subjugation of all other decisions, including the economic and housing measures to the political decision which is founded utlimately on settlement and the realization of the Greater Israel--emerges.

The issue of the Israeli settlement is projected in the Middle East policy at present. What is the role played by this issue, how has it developed since the creation of Israel until the present, what is the human instrument that serves this plan and what is its role in the Israeli economy and, consequently, in serving the political decision.

Let us start with the high standard of living and with the bringing in of immigrant Jews. If the economic conditions in a country are a main and fundamental issue, they are in Israel an issue of survival or non-survival primarily. Without high growth rates, Israel cannot attract and then absorb immigrants. Without new immigrants, the Israeli settlement program will decline. The problem will not lie in the limited number of new immigrants but in the fact that resident settlers will be liable to emigrate if the economic conditions deteriorate. This means that a strong economy is the key to overcoming the vicious circle in which Israel revolves. This is why the efforts to attain a high standard of living have constituted one of the mainstays of Israel's economic policy. This situation is due to the nature of Israel's human structure which is based on implanting settlers and on the constant flow of immigrants from abroad. Moreover, pressure on consumption leads to weakened immigration and the rise of unemployment leads to counter-emigration, especially among immigrants from Western Europe. We should keep in mind that the factors that have contributed to encouraging emigration to Israel and the propaganda means used to attract immigrants have not focused on ideological considerations alone but, in particular, on Israel's prosperity and standard of living.

At another level, we find that not all newcomers to Israel are from the same class. The academicians constitute such a high percentage that their absorption has created a problem. The same goes for businessmen who had enjoyed a high standard of living in the countries from which they emigrated. This situation has called for securing a high standard of living. This is why the standard of living in Israel, measured by the consumption criteria, is higher than similar standards in Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and other countries.

Immigration, Income and Vice Versa

Within the course of this rise in the standard of living, developments have occurred in the national production [growth] rate in some stages of Israel's life. The lowest point in the national production growth rate occurred in 1953. It is noticed on the other hand that the smallest number of immigrants came to the country in the same year. In the following year, and with the rise in the national production growth rate from less than 1 percent in 1953 to 20 percent in 1954, the number of immigrants rose from 1,200 in 1953 to 11,400 in 1954. The national production growth rate continued to govern the increase in the number of immigrants in the following period. This correlationship can be noticed in the year

1. The investment is made and the human expertise is gained outside Israel, whereas it reaps the net profits of the costs of education and experience, keeping in mind that the immigrant coming into Israel has an average of 10.4 years of education.

2. The immigrant Jewish scientists have maintained close relations with the highly specialized U.S. and European educational centers with which they had been connected before their departure for Israel. These scientists have thus enabled Israel to absorb and apply the latest technological achievements.

3. In addition to education and high learning and expertise, Jewish immigrants from the United States and Europe have transferred to Israel the capital accumulated in the Diaspora. No figures are available on the inflow of such capital.

4. Most of the immigrants to Israel are at the peak of their economic productivity namely at the age of 18-45 years.

The question that is raised finally is: How is this aid and how are these loans [sic] spent? Is there a recurrent need for the aid? Has the aid merely met a temporary need or has it also fulfilled a future need while meeting a current need as well?

Perhaps the latter pattern is the most serious pattern according to which the aid has been utilized. In addition to the end of the period of spending on certain aspects, especially the spending pertaining to immigrants, the financial remittances have been utilized to build the foundations of realizing Israel's economic aspiration. Israel has not been channeling its economic policy toward the recurrent daily problems, considering that it has channeled its resources for building an infrastructure capital embodied in improved, mechanized and modernized agriculture to secure foodstuffs by virtue of their being strategic commodities. Israeli agriculture has attained a degree of capital concentration which, in the estimate of many, exceeds the ideal degree in this sphere. At the industrial level, the Israeli plan has been embodied in hundreds of factories that use the best and latest equipment because the state encourages the constant replacement of this equipment by more advanced equipment through facilities [tax breaks and so forth] given to factory owners within a comprehensive plan aimed at enabling Israel to possess the best and latest means of production.

When the idle industrial capacity amounts to 40 percent of the production capacity of the industry as a whole, one can assess the advantage that Israel has taken of the capital available to it to build a firm industrial base that serves not only the interest of the present but also looks forward to meeting the needs of the future. Perhaps the statement of the Israeli Central Bank governor about the presence of 40,000 vacant jobs in 1972 and the minister of labor's statement about 100,000 Israelis holding 2 jobs simultaneously underline the extent of the idle Israeli production capacity and the extent to which Israel's economic policy has taken the future into its account.

In view of all of this, it can be said that the aid advanced to Israel has been invested mainly to create economic assets that form in themselves a capital embodied in the elements of developed production. Here emerges the importance of distinguishing between Israel's dependence on the foreign financial remittances,

1959 when the national production dropped in comparison to the preceding years and when the number of immigrants dropped from 60,200 in 1957 to 15,600 in 1958. With the resumed rise in the national production growth rate in 1961, 1962, 1963 and 1964, the number of immigrants rose successively from 16,000 in 1961 [presumably meaning 1960] to 40,600 then 53,800 then 53,200 and then 46,300. With the drop in the national production in the years 1965, 1966 and 1967--the years of the well-known economic crisis in Israel's economic history--the immigration numbers dropped to their lowest levels since 1953. These numbers dropped from 46,300 immigrants in 1964 to 22,900 in 1965, 8,300 in 1966 and 4,300 in 1974.

We thus find that the accelerated immigration pace governed by a rising national growth rate and, consequently, by Israel's ability to secure a high standard of living for its citizens, confirms indubitably the soundness of the statement that without a high standard of living, there will be no immigration.

In addition to immigration, the Israeli economy's growth depends on financial remittances and foreign aid. Most of the financial remittances are not (tied to) importation, such as the German remittances to the Israeli government and citizens, the contributions of the world Jewry in their various forms, including the remittances of the Jewish Organization which amounted to $2 billion between 1948 and 1970, keeping in mind that the remittances to the immigrants amounted in the same period to $1.2 billion. Added to these is the U.S. aid which almost forms a third section of the Israeli budget. This aid has been channeled toward other [sic] spheres of spending, such as dealing with the population growth which has amounted to 235 percent in the past 15 years.

Despite the continued immigration and its burdens, the annual [immigration] growth is now much less at a time when the Israeli economy is experiencing better conditions. Smaller immigration under a better economy reduces the burdens thrown on the shoulders of this economy. A population growth of 3 percent, compared to a growth of 16 percent in the preceding period, is reasonable and can be considered normal and similar to the population growth rates in any other society, especially since the channeling of a fundamental part of the Israeli budget toward development has enabled Israel to create such a firm economic base that an idle capacity has appeared in numerous industries. This idle capacity amounted in 1970 to 40 percent of the industrial sector as a whole and has escalated with the policy of continued growth and expansion--a policy that has enabled the Israeli economy to absorb a large number of the new immigrants through the operation of this idle production capacity.

The issue of finding work for new immigrants is not the issue sharply debated in Israel. The issue of housing them is the predominant issue. This is natural, considering their inflow rate.

When the issue becomes one of housing, then most of the problem of absorbing the immigrants is solved. We should keep in mind that the immigrants to Israel form on the one hand a burden to it and, on the other hand, a wealth for the country with their scientific credentials that are considered a semi-capital exceeding in value the costs shouldered by the countries from which these immigrants come, such as the costs of their education for example. In a study on the Israeli economy, Dr Ibrahim 'Uways lists the benefits that Israel reaps from the new immigrants in the following:

aid and loans and the dependence of the budget of any other country, such as Jordan, on foreign aid, considering that this aid, small as it is, goes in Jordan into irrecoverable expenses. This means that the financial remittances must be viewed in the light of the direction in which they are spent.

Does the aid turn into consumer expenses or into capital commodities that can be considered a part of the national capital?

The industrial base which Israel has built for itself has surpassed the phase of foundation to the phase of actual production, considering that there has been a real leap in the national production of the State of Israel. This leap could not happen so suddenly were it not for the long period of foundation started since the creation of Israel--a period of foundation which is bearing its fruits now. Exports of steel products amounted in 1972 to 5-fold their volume in 1967, according to Chaim Bar-lev, the then minister of commerce and industry. The same goes for the weaponry production which amounted in value to 1.8 billion Israeli pounds, i.e. 5-fold its volume in 1967, keeping in mind that the volume of Israel's exports of this kind of production rose 9-fold in the same period, amounting in value to $90 million in 1972 compared to $10 million in 1967, according to a statement by the director of the Ministry of Defense. We should keep in mind that the national production growth rate in 1972 amounted to 9 percent and that the industrial production growth rate amounted to 44 percent in the years 1970, 1971 and 1972, meaning that this production grew at an average rate of 15 percent annually. All this means that the development in the national production comes fundamentally from the industrial sector. Moreover, the growth in some branches of the industrial sector has been higher than in other branches. This growth rate has reached 100 percent annually in the heavy industries, such as the steel and military industries. This means that the heavy industry base has begun to produce and give returns. The best proof of this is the statement by the general director of the Israeli Ministry of Interior that the national production of Israel will equal the Egyptian national production despite the fact that Egypt's population is 10-fold Israel's population, considering that Israel's national production has amounted to 7-8 billion dollars compared to $8.5 billion for the Egyptian national production.

This Israeli economic situation which has come as a result of the West German aid program and of the U.S. aid has been accompanied by the implementation of the Israeli industrialization plan to limits exceeding this plan's operational capacity at the end of the period covered by the aid program.

The enormous rates at which the Israeli industry has grown makes the size of the future burdens thrown on Israel's shoulders a small and insignificant one when compared with the benefits that Israel has realized as a result of its industrialization.

To sum up, the more the economy progresses and gets closer with its industrial structure to the structure prevailing at present in the advanced countries, the greater the need Israel will have for semi-skilled and unskilled technical labor to perform an essential role in the production process. The more progress and industrialization is achieved, the more need there will be for this type of labor. The present immigration to Israel, in terms of both of its pattern and its professional structure, cannot meet the Israeli economy's needs for this kind of labor. Consequently, there has to be a permanent source to supply this kind of

labor and to guarantee its continued flow. This is what has been relatively supplied so far by the Arab labor in the occupied territories.

Western Capitalist Pattern

The growth of the foreign workforce in Israel represents a copy of the European pattern insofar as reliance on foreign labor is considered a general phenomenon which all the West European countries share, with the exception of Spain, Portugal and Italy.

The intensity of this phenomenon corresponds to the size of a country's population. At the time when foreign labor amounts to 6 percent in Belgium, 7 percent in Britain, 9 percent in Austria and 11 percent in West Germany, we find that this percentage doubles in the countries that are very highly advanced in their technology and that posses an enormous capital, such as Switzerland where foreign workers form 27 percent of the total workforce and in Luxembourg where the foreign labor amounts to the same percentage as in Switzerland, keeping in mind that Switzerland's population is 6 million and that of Luxembourg is 76,000 people only.

This correlation between increased foreign labor and the small population of a country is our inlet to discussing the situation in Israel and the role that non-Jewish workers play in serving the Israeli economy.

Israel is trying to build its economy after the model of the economy of the western capitalist countries. This is why its economy is being exposed to the phenomena experienced by the advanced countries throughout the past 100 years and until the present, i.e. from the time when these countries had the worst class relations internally until the time when the capitalism of these countries developed a high degree of concentration with progress in the art of production, i.e. the time when internal production relations of a new type entered these countries, developing them into imperialist countries exporting capital. The greater the role played by the exported capital in yielding returns, the greater has been the part performed by foreign labor in the economy of these countries, both at home and in the colonies.

The significant role played by foreign labor in the economy of Western Europe and of the United States has been summed up by Professor (Bernard Krisser) of Toulouse University who has said: "The labor immigration to Europe is a grant of resources offered by the poor to the rich." The magazine (Khurtchen) also sums up the issue, saying that foreign workers "have, with time, become essential for the European economy whereas they constituted a transient need in the past. Europe has come to rely on them to such a degree that their departure, if it were to take place, would be a catastrophe."

Foreign 'Arab' Labor

Despite the short time passing since its existence in the Arab area, Israel has come to experience the phenomena and ailments of the deep-rooted capitalist countries. Israel's economy has the characteristics of the economy of these countries, because, as already pointed out, the capitalist countries have made available to Israel a capital that enabled it to pass quickly the phase necessary to concentrate

and develop capital at a bigger rate than the population growth rate. Yitzhak Rabin underlined this situation when he said: "We have reached a situation where manpower in Israel is more beneficial to us than any other factor." This means that Israel has reached the stage where there is no balance between the element of capital and the element of labor. The proof of this is the increase in the idle capacity in the Israeli industry as a result of the growth in investments. Thi has generated a constant pressure on and an urgent demand for labor.

The ideal and strategic solution for Israel lies in changing the Israeli economic equation and in creating a degree of compatibility among the production elements in order to overcome the negative impact of the current Israeli economic policy without undermining the economic and political base on which Israel was established by not submitting to the weaker element but rather by strengthening it to make it compatible with the stronger element (the capital).

The new element lies in expanding the labor base to the degree that enables Israel to overcome the problems resulting from the imbalance between capital and labor. These problems are:

1. Utilizing the nonproductive capacity.

2. Increasing production, reducing costs and realizing surpluses in large production.

3. Reducing the real wage rates.

4. Modifying the balance of payments.

5. Ending unemployment among the (technical) Israeli labor.

6. Putting an end to the imbalance between the services and production.

7. Opening the door for new investments.

This new situation can only be created through reliance on foreign labor because it is impossible for Israel to realize it with its present population structure and with the structure of the immigrants coming to it (most of whom possess production skills and capabilities that are as far as can be from these simple tasks but that do not make up for the current shortage in the Israeli labor, namely the shortage of unskilled labor).

Therefore, the foreign labor that will be absorbed will contribute to utilizing the idle capacity in the Israeli economy. The utilization of this capacity means that Israel will benefit from all the capital employed so far.

Moreover, utilizing the idle capacity and, consequently, increasing Israel's production will be accompanied by a crop in the cost of producing Israeli goods and a general drop in the value of the real wages paid.

This drop will constitute a main factor in facilitating the entry of Israel's goods to the world markets at more competitive prices. The labor which will be added will be less expensive practically because foreign labor is usually less expensive

than local labor. While the foreign worker is denied all the privileges given the Jewish worker, such as paid leave, compensations, insurance and its ultimate financial value, this worker's production is higher by virtue of the fact that he is made to work longer hours and the fact that he is accustomed to all kinds of hard physical labor as a result of the nature of the environment in which he has grown up on the one hand and the nature of the work that he has engaged in, particularly agricultural work, on the other hand.

The ability of the Arab worker to raise production, in comparison to the Jewish worker, is also the result of the types of work entrusted to this worker. These works are not in conflict with the logic of specialization and of division of labor which is considered fundamental for raising production. Most often, foreign workers are engaged only in manual labor that doesn't require long training while Jewish workers perform the more complicated production phases that require technical skill.

Broadening the labor base by importing labor from outside to guarantee the ideal mixture of the various production elements is the only possible economical way. This is also the way that all the countries that were in Israel's position have followed. The rate of university graduates working in the Israeli economy amounts to 15.61 percent. This rate is higher than the acknowledged ideal rate which amounts to 13.4 in West Germany. Meanwhile, the percentage of Arab workers in the Israeli economy is 4.5 percent. This labor has led to a drop in the university graduates in the economy from 15.61 to 14.9 percent. Thus, the new rate has approached the ideal rate.

It can be thus said that Israel has achieved sufficiency in terms of university graduates and of their work experiences whereas it is in constant need of technical [sic] manpower. This is why Israel has experienced an ever-increasing braindrain. Commenting on this manifestation, the London (JEWISH OBSERVER) has said: "The emigration of highly skilled people has become one of the most serious problems facing Israel."

The percentage of the Arab labor in the total labor of the Israeli economy does not reflect the relative significance of this Arab labor, considering that Arab workers form a qualitative increase in a specific sphere of labor and considering that it is not easy [for Israel] to make up for the shortage in the unskilled labor. This unskilled labor includes the Arab labor used since 1948--workers which Israel classifies as citizens. These workers are a part of Israel's workforce but Israel does not divulge their numbers. Now that the current number of Arab citizens amounts to 450,000 citizens, this number will supply the Israeli unskilled labor market with no less than 150,000 workers, considering that the workforce amounts to 35 percent of the total population, especially when we notice that the Arabs enter the cheap labor market at an early age as a result of the lack of the academic study opportunities available to the other citizens.

By adding the percentage formed by workers of the area occupied in 1948 to the percentage of workers of the territories occupied in 1967, an indisputable fact becomes evident, namely the fact that the unskilled workforce on which the Israeli economy is founded is the Arab workforce.

There is another important observation, namely that the Arab workforce is needed urgently to create the required balance in the production relations in Israel.

not from the narrow angle of the logic about which a lot has been said--i.e., the logic of black labor and hard work, a reference to the nature of the work carried out by the Arab workers in the occupied territories.

In its other aspect, the issue is more complex because its direct and indirect consequences constitute the only way out from the dilemma with which the Israeli economy is faced and the only means that gives Israel's current investments their true dimension and turns them into a real asset. The human element is the only element which Israel cannot secure easily. This is why the Arab workforce has become necessary for the Israeli economy in light of the economic elements which we have already pointed out. This workforce has also turned into a way out of the bottleneck reached by the Israeli economy--a bottleneck encountered by the economy of every advanced capitalist country after reaching a certain degree of concentration, growth and investment growth. The phenomenon of foreign labor, like any other phenomenon, must produce a number of other subsidiary phenomena and must result in consequences which the state concerned has to deal with. This is because foreign labor is not just a figure added and because the interactions of this labor are not confined to the economic sphere alone. When the number of foreigners in any country amounts to a certain percentage of the population, a number of social and cultural phenomena begin to emerge. There is the European model. Some studies believe that when the number of foreigners amounts to 10 percent of the population or more, the aforementioned phenomena begin to take a serious character. The only solution that can harmonize Israel's urgent need for the Arab workforce with its inability and its lack of readiness to absorb this workforce lies in using this workforce economically while, at the same time, declining to take the political responsibility for it, thus making Israel's relationship with the Arab workers a pure relationship of work that ends with the end of the working day.

Perhaps this situation is what distinguishes Israel from the other countries that have imported foreign labor.

Underlining the economic structure of Israel and the elements on which this structure is based, especially the role of the Jewish immigrants and the use of the Arab labor, shows how far this economy is employed in making the Israeli strategic political decisions. Perhaps the research and studies conducted by the PLO Research Center show that the Israeli economy, which is directed by the political authority, has been constant since the creation of Israel. Consequently, the Israeli economic strategy, which is focused around the idea of increasing the manpower comprised of Jewish immigrants, gives the clear impression that the Israeli settlement process is a continuing plan from which no Israeli ruler will swerve.

This is why the wager on a change by this or that ruling face is a mirage insofar as the search for a negotiated solution to the Middle East problem is concerned, especially in regard to the settlement policy and the self-rule for Gaza and the West Bank. Regardless of what different viewpoints emerge among the Israeli rulers over the Camp Divid negotiation process and regardless of how many elements resign from the Israeli cabinet--such as ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs Moshe Dayan and Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman who has said about the settlement issue: "I will permit the Arabs to vote and elect their private councils and I will let them, as much as possible, live the way they want, provided that we keep in our hands the Israelis' security and defense finally and decisively." Weizman has also

likened the Israelis' right to settle in the occupied territories to the right acquired by the Arabs to live in Israel and has called for strengthening the existing Jewish settlements. Addressing his words to an imaginary Palestinian interlocuter, Weizman has said: "You must understand, Palestinian friend, that I will live with you in the West Bank and Gaza. Consequently, we have to find a way to coexist." Weizman has also asserted that Jerusalem is Israel's capital and will remain so--regardless of all of this, the wager on the disagreements among the rulers of Israel will remain insignificant and will remain a waste of time. The biggest proof of this is the atmosphere that Israel has been trying to create in the West Bank, Gaza and southern Lebanon. Perhaps the only outlet that can save Menachem Begin from his international and domestic isolation lies in his launching some blitzkrieg wars, especially in southern Lebanon which will continue to be the sacrificial lamb.

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RECOMMENDATIONS ON ALLOCATION OF IRRIGATION WATER RESOURCES

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 9 Nov 80 p 6

[Article by Muhammad Abu Ghawsh: "Natural Resources Agency Proposals on Optimum Use of Irrigation Water Resources: Agricultural Strategy Requires Just Distribution of Limited Water Resources; Provision of Basic Information Necessary To Produce Solutions to Water Problems"]

[Text] Without a doubt, Jordan has limited water resources. With the growing need for water for various uses, especially irrigation, it has become evident that there is a need for legislation and guidance pertaining to water use so as to ensure just distribution and optimum utilization in accordance with advantageous economic factors.

The Natural Resources Agency has prepared a study on the optimum use of water resources for irrigation in Jordan.

The study, which was prepared by engineer Dr Hani Rashid of the Natural Resources Agency's Irrigation Department, indicates that it has become commonplace in many parts of the world for rural sector development to demand special attention. The aim of this attention is not just to confront the growing demand for agricultural products but also to raise the standard of living among farmers. In arid and semi-arid climates, the development of agriculture necessarily requires irrigation since it is the availability of water rather than land which is the limiting factor in production. This is certainly applicable to Jordan since water is scarce in the kingdom and its distribution does not match demand either from the standpoint of time or from the standpoint of quantity. What is required is a doubling of the benefit realized from agricultural production. Where ground and surface water are available, a strategy of dual usage must be applied in accordance with economic factors pertinent to the area. This study proposes a series of mathematical programming models for the analysis and guidance of dual water use in Jordan. Inasmuch as water is the limiting factor, it is important to take into account the effect which a reduction in the amounts of water available for plants below the projected level will have on the economic profits of the area. Moreover, before arriving at a "mathematical model," the natural conditions must be understood so that the model will be appropriate.

The Natural Model

The study states that the use of water for irrigation can be examined under the following headings:

--irrigated lands

--water resources

--crops.

Irrigated Lands

With regard to irrigated lands, the study says that the kingdom is divided into several relatively independent physiographical regions. These include the Jordan Valley, where both surface and ground water are available, and the eastern highlands, the central mountains, and the southern regions where ground water is the predominant source of water. The Jordan Valley region was selected because of its social and agricultural importance, and due to the fact that its climate possesses certain special advantages which enable it to attain high agricultural production.

A key feature of agricultural development in the valley is the tremendous impact of the al-Ghawr al-Sharqiyah Canal and its projected extensions. For this reason, the irrigated land can be divided into three areas:

--Area 1: From the beginning of the branch tunnel to the beginning of the third stage.

--Area 2: Includes the last three stages (stages 3 through 5) of the current project.

--Area 3: Includes the project area for the future extension of the canal to the Dead Sea area.

In alloting the scarce water resources, the principle of equitable distribution is being taken into account so that none of the three areas will be accorded special treatment at the expense of the others.

Water Resources

The study says that the valley's water resources consist of surface water and ground water. With regard to surface water, the Jordan Valley possesses the Jordan River which runs between the Sea of Galilee (the collection point of suitable irrigation water outside Jordanian territority) and the Dead Sea. The river's water depends on the nature of the water discharged from the sea. Because of the diverting of tributary streams before the river reaches the valley, the river water has become highly saline and unsuitable for irrigation. Thus the river now functions only as a natural drainage channel. This lends special importance to the connecting wadis as the sole source of surface water in the valley. The al-Ghawr al-Sharqiyah Canal receives this water and channels it to the cultivated lands in the

area at an average rate of 635 million cubic meters per year. Approximately 90 percent of this amount comes from the Yarmuk River, the Wadi al-'Arab, the al-Zarqa' River and from existing and proposed storage facilities.

The productive capacity of ground water is primarily determined by rainfall in the hills alongside the valley. The rainwater flows through fractured rock and fissures toward the Jordan River and the Dead Sea. Also, part of the water is supplied by means of the connecting wadis. Preliminary studies give differing estimates as to the amount of ground water which could be utilized without adverse effects, but an approximate figure is 50 million cubic meters per year.

Features of the Valley

The studies state that because the valley is below sea level and is free from frost during the winter, early crops can be produced which will dominate local and neighboring markets. Moreover, the soil of the valley is a fertile sedimentary soil produced by deposits left by floods in the wadis and rivers.

Using the type of farming proposed by the agency and based on its estimates of water needs for crops, cultivation of the 36,000 hectares of land available in the valley would require between 570 million and 700 million cubic meters of water per year. Given the 55-percent efficiency of current irrigation techniques, these figures become 1,000 million and 1,300 million cubic meters. Even with the use of spray irrigation, which has an efficiency rate of 70 to 75 percent, water needs would still amount to at least 760 million cubic meters annually.

In view of the 685 million cubic meters of water which is available--and even under the most optimistic of scenarios--any agricultural production strategy requires an irrigation process in which a limited quantity of water is distributed over a large area of arable land.

Benefits of the Proposed Project

As was pointed out in the preceding paragraphs, the first stage of the project deals with reaching a higher level of irrigation water use under conditions of scarcity in order to double the anticipated benefits from the project. Recently, researchers have leaned toward employing the method of linking water deficiencies during the life of a particular crop to production.

Agricultural Development Strategy

The desired goal is to realize the maximum return and the minimum cost in the irrigation projects, and this provides broad outlines for the development strategy. The study underscores the importance of the Yarmuk River in the development of the valley as well as the necessity of establishing dams on the river. This will provide water to the first area from storage due to the high costs involved, and the flow of the river will be utilized for the second and third areas.

The Zarqa' River and the Tilal Dam play a key role in the irrigation process in both the second and third areas. As for ground water sources, each source is currently being utilized within its area to meet as much of the need as possible due to high costs.

This study is aimed chiefly at developing an initial method to define a logical course toward a solution of the problem of using limited water resources in areas with a large amount of arable land. The proposed project can be applied in any agricultural area provided that the basic information needed to produce solutions is availalbe. It is hoped that this brief presentation will stimulate an interest among those in charge of planning in initiating studies of the natural environment which will ensure the detailed and accurate data necessary in order to gain practical results from this model. This will also pave the way toward raising the level of effectiveness of mathematical programming models in this field.

8591
CSO: 4802

SAUDI VISA LAW OUTLINED

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 3 Dec 80 p 2

[Text]

By a Staff Writer

JEDDAH, Dec. 2 — December 22 is the deadline for the departure of dependents who entered the Kingdom on a visit visa after August 20, unless they meet certain criteria permitting expatriate families in the Kingdom, according to an Interior Ministry order issued last Sunday.

Those family members not complying with the order will be held at departure points and prevented from leaving the country until their guardians or sponsors are located and penalized, the order said. Punishment may include up to six weeks imprisonment and a SR10,000 fine, in addition to deportation of both parties.

The ministry also has asked pilgrims and umra performers to leave the country as soon as possible after their religious duties. Those who stay too long will be liable to punishment along with anyone who gives them work, or shelter or hides them.

In a televised interview recently Interior Undersecretary for Passports and Immigration Sheikh Ibrahim Owaji said that even those who fell victims of crooks and entered Saudi Arabia in good faith, thinking that they hold a real valid entry or work visa and find out that they were tricked or fail to find their sponsor will have to report to the nearest police post or interior ministry office. They would then be imprisoned and deported.

Security men already have arrested hundreds of crooks who used to extort money from workers abroad eager to come to Saudi Arabia on a contract basis. Sometimes fake contracts and forged visas were given them. There also have been cases where fictitious sponsors import labor against a sum of money. Once in the Kingdom, the workers would start hunting for a job, which undoubtedly constitutes a danger for the country's security.

Towards the end of August, the Interior Ministry announced new regulations to control the influx of families into the country by specifying categories of expatriates entitled to bring their wives and children. The categories include university professors, teachers, doctors, pharmacists, veterinarians and others.

Following is an excerpt from the ministry's statement:

The Ministry of Interior, eager to curb the influx of foreigners into the Kingdom, is restricting their presence to productive personnel required by some sectors here without being joined by their families, except in exceptional circumstances and in the case of certain professional specializations like medicine and engineering.

Those permitted to ask for their wives to join them are university professors, teachers at all levels — including occupational training centers, doctors, pharmacists, veterinary surgeons, engineers — including chemists, farmers and insecticide specialists; weapons and ammunition specialists who are qualified graduates of universities and educational institutions specializing in these fields, managers of companies and enterprises of no fewer than 100 employees on the basis of evidence issued by the General Organization of Social Insurance or a bank certificate, provided that the companies deal with no less than SR1 million a year and have a capital of no less than SR1 million.

Those with long residence permits, of no less than five years at the time of publishing this law, will be allowed to call for their wives if it is proved that special circumstances had precluded them in the past from doing so, whatever their occupations might be.

Wives and minor children, who already are here on visit visas, of those in the categories permitted to accompany their guardians, may apply for permission to stay to the government recruitment bureaus for approval according to the regulations. They also must contact passport offices to complete the procedures.

Employers wishing to obtain residence permits for personnel already in the country must send them out of the country then apply to the recruitment bureaus on their behalf, according to the ministry's order. The offices of the minister, his deputy and provincial governors will cease to handle applications for residence permits, it said.

CSO: 4820

SULTAN QABUS COMMENTS ON SECURITY, HORMUZ STRAIT

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 17 Nov 80 pp 34-37

[Interview with Sultan Qabus; date and place not given]

[Excerpt]

There are fears that U.S. and other Western military presence in and around Oman increases the danger of a super-power confrontation in the Gulf region. Do you think those fears are justified?

I believe that we can rely on the United States and other Western countries to exercise sufficient restraint in deploying their military presence in the area to avoid bringing about a super-power confrontation in the Gulf region. However, Oman as a Third World country must deplore the present instability which could precipitate super-power intervention in the area.

Some Arab countries have said that this military presence represents potential U.S. control of the oil of the Gulf and therefore eliminates Arab oil as a possible political weapon or as a tool of Arab economic leverage towards a solution of the Middle Eastern crisis. Do you share that view?

If the oil-producing countries of the area act in close cooperation with a clear awareness of the threat that faces them in these unstable times, then I do not think that there would be a danger of foreign intervention. I do not think, either, that the United States is seeking to obtain control, but I would not extend this view to include the other super-power, the Soviet Union, which I believe has ambitions not only in the Middle East, but also throughout the rest of the world.

Does Your Majesty agree with those who are saying that U.S. and other Western military presence in the Gulf region – including Oman – is likely to increase and become permanent? Would you approve of a further increase in American and Western military presence in and around Oman, and would you approve of that presence becoming permanent?

I have no intention that foreign

troops of any nationality should be stationed either temporarily or permanently in Oman. With regard to the American and other Western military presence in the general Gulf region, I think in view of the grave threat to the area that exists from Soviet expansionism, it is desirable that a firm position be taken up by the Western powers to contain it. This firm position must clearly be supported by adequate military over-the-horizon power if the deterrence is to be convincing.

Do you share Western fears about the possibility of attempts being made by any state or guerilla organization to block the Hormuz Straits? And do you regard the current Western military presence as an adequate deterrent?

I believe that, given its unique geo-political position and the vital role it plays in the supply of oil to the free world, the Strait of Hormuz must be regarded as vulnerable. That is why more than two years ago I appealed to our brother Arab states in the region to provide Oman with the necessary finance to equip our defense forces to enable them to carry out their responsibility of protecting free international passage of shipping through the Strait. It is for the countries of the area and Oman in particular, since the passage is within our territorial waters, to organize this protection and not to rely upon a foreign military presence to do so. We are still awaiting this cooperation.

Do you approve of Mr. Carter's suggestion that the states which are dependent on the Hormuz Strait form a joint naval force to guarantee that this strait remain open? Would you provide such a force with the required base facilities should you be asked to do so? Has such a request been made?

I do not believe there is a requirement for a joint naval force. Instead, Oman should be provided with what it requires in order to defend its own sovereign waters.

The general impression is that attempts are being made to destabilize the Gulf region. Do you think the impression is accurate, and if so, who do you believe is behind those attempts? Does Oman feel threatened in any way?

I certainly believe that attempts are being made to destabilize not only the Gulf region but wherever possible, in the entire world. And I have equally no doubt that it is the Soviet Union which is responsible for this situation. The world has the fullest evidence of Soviet aggressive and expansionist designs – we have seen it in Africa, we have seen it in the take-over of South Yemen and Ethiopia, and we are now seeing it in the attempted take-over of Afghanistan.

How would you evaluate Oman's current relations with Egypt? What is your reaction to Egypt's offer of bases for the United States in the event of a threat to the security of any Arab country?

Our relations with Egypt are those of friendship, based upon our belief that the brotherhood of Arab states must continually be strengthened and consolidated. I cannot comment on your question as to Egypt's offer of bases to the United States since this is a matter which concerns Egypt alone.

How would you describe your attitude toward the Camp David agreements now? Do you think the progress that has been made in Egyptian-Israeli relations justifies a reconsideration of the Arab position on those agreements?

As I have said many times before, I regard the Camp David agreement as having been a promising first step towards a negotiated peace, provided that the final result totally restores the rights and dignity of the Palestinian people. What is to be deplored is the intransigent attitude that has been subsequently taken by Israel, which has so far blocked any further progress by taking Jerusalem. The Israelis have created the opportunity of isolating Egypt through the reaction to this step of the other Arab countries.

Given the Arabs' present state of disarray, do you expect the summit conference to be held on schedule this month? Do you expect to attend? Do you anticipate any beneficial results should the meeting be held?

I certainly believe that the summit conference should be held. The more problems that concern our brotherhood of nations, the more it is desirable that we should confer together about them. I have every hope that beneficial results should come from the conference. My own intention as to whether I shall personally attend will be made known in good time.

By the time you answer these questions, we will know who the next President of the United States is. If it is Mr. Reagan, do you expect this apparently hardline approach to the Soviets to lead to a deterioration of the situation in the Gulf? If it is Mr. Carter, what action do you expect him to take to promote stability in the Gulf?

I have every confidence that the American Administration is fully aware of and concerned at the situation in the Gulf area and in the world in general. I believe that administration also fully understands the need to promote stability in the area and the requirement that if this stability is to be created and preserved, it must be based upon a mutual respect by the super-powers for the territorial integrity and independence of the states in the region. ●

CSO: 4820

COMMENT ON 'ZIONIST' MOVES TO ANNEX GOLAN HEIGHTS

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 19 Nov 80 p 3

[Article by Elyas Khuri]

[Text] Political circles in the Zionist entity recently began a series of activities, moves and meetings in which ruling and opposition Zionist parties participated, in preparation for the discussion of a project to annex the occupied Syrian Arab Golan Heights to the Zionist entity.

Zionist political activity increased in this area, taking advantage of the current political situations in the Arab nations and the world as a whole. The activities are:

1. Reagan's victory in the American presidential elections, which means more American military, economic and political support of "Israel," especially since Reagan did not conceal his unlimited support of "Israel" and its schemes for the occupied Arab lands; nor did he conceal his determination to unconditionally support it since it is the main strategic supporter of the United States in the world. We must not forget that Reagan considered "Israel's" annexation of Jerusalem as a legitimate act and emphasized the necessity of having the Arab Jerusalem under Zionist control.

2. The successful visit by Yitzhak Navon, the Zionist President, to Al-Sadat at the end of last month. This visit resulted, according to the news, in Al-Sadat's offer of more concessions in the Zionist enemy's favor, among which was his agreement not to oppose the Golan Heights annexation project.

3. The breaking of the ranks due to the Iraq-Iran war which shifted the world's interest away from the basic Arab Palestinian problem; the involvement of Arab regimes with secondary or marginal matters; and the increased American incursion in the area through concentrating its military existence in Egypt, the Gulf and some other Arab countries.

4. The fact that Syria is the only country in the area that keeps reminding the Arabs and the world that the central Arab problem is Palestine, and that all efforts and potentials must be directed toward solving this problem only. Syria is also the only country that is increasingly opposed to the Camp David plans, who was also able, despite all circumstances, to thwart these plans and prevent them from spreading and achieving their goals.

These matters led to the prominence of the quick political movement in order to have the Knesset issue a decision to annex the Golan Heights to the foreign entity following the pattern of the decision to annex the occupied Arab Jerusalem a few months ago.

The Syrian Arab Republic memorandum to the UN and other international organizations and establishments pointed out the danger the enemy's antagonistic expansion policy poses, saying that the mere discussion of the Zionist Knesset of such a project is considered a glaring encroachment upon the UN principles and international law.

The memorandum warned the international circles of the serious dangers to peace and security, in our area and throughout the world, this Zionist plan involved.

The memorandum also pointed out that the Israeli authorities' ignoring of international law, their denial of the Arab Palestinian people's rights, ignoring the lawfulness of the UN and their decisions beginning with seizing other people's lands by force and building settlements in occupied lands, forcing Arab residents to leave their lands and then annexing the Arab Jerusalem and making it their capital; all this would not have happened had the Security Council gone beyond criticizing these measures to the stage of applying penalties on Israel as discussed in the Charter of the UN.

There is no doubt that "Israel" is determined to continue its antagonistic expansion policy, and this determination is based on international circumstances, the UN's weakness and Reagan's victory, the Arab circumstances, Al-Sadat's treason and the Iraq-Iran war.

When Syria asked the UN to take practical measures that guarantee the control of Israeli antagonistic actions and work toward implementing its decisions in that area, it did that based on a feeling of international responsibility and the necessity of reminding the UN of the international dangers resulting from Israel's policy. The truth is that everybody realizes that the international organization is weak due to the current Arab and international circumstances and from its past experience; it is incapable of putting Israel in its proper place.

This sad truth in turn leads us to the only fact that our country realizes: that putting Israel in its proper place and controlling its expansionist schemes and for elimination [of Arabs] will only come by force.

If the current Arab circumstances, beginning with Al-Sadat's treason and ending with the Iraq-Iran war, prevent the Arab ranks from uniting Arab energies to drive them into the battle of liberation and dignity, this will not prevent Syria from continuing its preparations for the battle of dignity which must come sooner or later.

The friendship and cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union and the announcement of the unification with Libya are only specific jumps which Syria achieved toward the preparation for another October War which will put an end to the Zionist racist aggression against the Arab nation.

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AUTOMATED BAKERIES TO ELIMINATE BREAD SHORTAGES

Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 28 Nov 80 p 3

[Report on an Interview with 'Akif Bakir, Chairman of Automated Bakeries Committee by Salamah Dahdal; Date and Place not Given: "How Much Have Our Automated Bakeries Done To Solve the Bread Shortage? Serious Steps To Expand Automated Bakeries; Tireless Effort To Furnish 50 Bakeries in the Capitals of Governorates"]

[Excerpts] There is a demand for bread at every instant because bread is the principal and essential component of every meal. However, bread is not always available. There are painful stories and accounts and irritating difficulties in our daily lives about obtaining bread--a task which sometimes requires that we put up with hardship and loss of time.

One chokes on every morsel of bread one eats because of what one has to endure to get that loaf of bread. We see scores of children, women and men crowding each other in lines that form in front of private sector bakeries. In addition, there are other negative phenomena: the bread is adulterated in the process of production, and there is fraud in weighing and pricing the bread.

There is no doubt that there are numerous reasons for this shortage. We believe that the reliance on private sector bakeries for bread has been one of the major obstacles [to a solution], and a factor contributing to the shortage. Hence, we are calling attention to the importance of automated bakeries for overcoming this shortage in all the governorates of the country. They will relieve the citizen and provide him with his daily bread at the appropriate time and at the appropriate price.

Will the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade hasten to make this experiment which has proven its success years ago a reality? This is what we will try to find out in the interview we conducted with Mr 'Akif Bakir, chairman of the Automated Bakeries Committee in the country.

Bakeries under Construction

The Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade has been building numerous automated bakeries in the governorates and the large areas in the country so as to make bread available to the citizen. The ministry has installed the necessary production lines for these bakeries and provided them with the appropriate staff. These

bakeries have been operating and providing good bread for several years. The total daily production of these bakeries is 594 tons.

Regarding the production lines of these bakeries Mr 'Akif Bakir, chairman of the Bakeries Establishment Committee said, "These lines were installed early in 1979. Therefore, they have been produced and installed in a modern way. The production capacity of a single production line operating 2 shifts to produce flat Arabic bread is 10 tons. These lines are operated by Syrian workers who have been professionally trained to operate the lines. Some of the workers were trained in the technology of the kneading and baking process. In addition, engineers working in the mechanical and electrical field attend to the proper performance of the machines so as to develop and improve production."

Bakeries That Will Be Operated Soon

This production capacity will soon be complemented by the new capacity of automated bakeries which are currently being installed so that they can be placed in production.

The daily bread production of [bakeries operating in two shifts] will thus become 898 tons.

Mr Bakir said, "The ministry's plan to expand automated bakeries to make bread available throughout the Syrian Arab country is a serious and an ambitious plan."

Construction work is in full swing on the buildings where the production lines will eventually be installed. Construction has begun on 50 buildings. These are scattered throughout the capitals of the governorates and the major administrative districts. Besides this activity in the area of automated bakeries, the Ministry of Supply has endeavored to establish capacities for producing bread manually. So far, the number of ovens producing bread in Damascus is 46; their daily production capacity is 125 tons of flat bread.

For the purpose of providing enough flour for consumption and guaranteeing [its delivery] at the appropriate time and with the correct specifications for the production of bread, an additional milling capacity has been insured by building 11 mills. These are distributed throughout the governorates. The daily production of these mills is 3,000 tons of flour. To execute the plan of the Ministry of Supply, work will begin soon on building 6 other mills whose daily production capacity will be 1,500 tons.

To strengthen the efforts that are being made to improve the quality of bread, the ministry is building yeast plants to insure the public and the priviate sectors' needs of this material with the best specifications. The Ministry of Supply is continuing efforts to achieve food security for citizens and to make bread available to all citizens by opening outlets or stalls for selling bread to the consumer.

Bakeries under Construction

The chairman of the Bakeries Construction Committee said that there was a large group of automated bakeries which public sector companies needed to build so as

contribute to a solution to the bread shortage. Some of these bakeries will be completed in 1981. Another group will be completed in mid 1982. This is in accordance with the expansion plan that was drawn up by the ministry to increase automated bakeries.

Mr 'Akif added, "Production lines will be installed in these bakeries as soon as construction work is completed. The process of preparing the equipment and the necessary appurtenances--including electricity, storage space for flour, water tanks and fuel tanks--is going on now."

Expanding the Establishment of Bakeries Will Solve the Shortage

The chairman of the Bakeries Committee said, "The expansion process that one notices in the ministry's future plan does not begin to solve the bread shortage, since the beginning of a solution has been pursued since early 1980 when production plans for Arabic bread were made in all the governorates. Yet, the current expansion plan is in fact the solution that will finally eliminate the bread shortage, the citizen's basic food." He said, "The ministry's plan was expeditious and effective. It utilized several methods to meet the demands of daily consumption. The ministry expanded the establishment of provisional traditional bakeries and established the automated production lines in the governorates where the bread shortage has been acute since 1979."

In Damascus alone, the ministry placed 46 ovens in production. It must be said here that by looking into these serious steps that the Ministry of Supply took to install automated lines to produce Arabic bread and expand the construction of bakeries in all the governorates and districts, we can formulate an idea about this major project which was recommended by President Hafiz al-Asad to make bread--the people's basic food--available in the proper quantity and quality.

What about the Quality of the Bread?

Mr 'Akif says, "The quality of the bread does in fact depend on numerous factors [which must be available] so that the bread would have the desired quality. Among the basic factors that lead to a good quality product are the primary materials that are used in production. Flour, salt, yeast and water are among these materials. The more these materials conform to the required specifications, the better the quality of the bread.

"The worker who monitors the levels of humidity and the temperatures in the fermentation chambers and in the ovens affects production considerably. In this regard we must acknowledge that packaging the bread which is sold in plastic bags while it is still hot, and what this bread is subjected to while it is being transported from the bakery to the consumer are some of the matters that still affect the quality of the bread sold to citizens. But the ministry is serious about avoiding these negative factors so that we can have the quality of bread we desire under all circumstances. Setting up training courses for the staff, monitoring the quality of the ingredients that are used in the production of bread and improving the method of packaging, transporting and selling bread are all matters that the ministry is studying equally with the new production lines in the completed buildings.

Meeting the Needs of Rural Areas

The Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade has an ambitious plan to meet the needs of the capitals of the governorates and the major cities. It will then proceed gradually to meet the needs of the rural areas. In this plan the ministry is taking population and demand into consideration. Since one production line operating 2 shifts can produce 10 tons of bread, as Mr 'Akif Bakir already mentioned, this quantity will naturally be sufficient for 20,000 persons if the per capita daily consumption of bread is 500 grams. It is on this basis that the 5-Year Plan for automated bakeries was established.

How Will the Stalls Be Distributed?

The distribution of sale outlets in city sections is usually done according to population density and demand. A stall for selling bread will be installed wherever the demand for bread is greater. This will be determined through the coordination of efforts between the Public Company for Automated Bakeries and the directorates for supply and internal trade whose employees can be found in the sections of cities around the clock observing the supply situation of bread and other materials. A stall would be placed where the largest number of citizens would be served and where it would be easily accessible so that citizens can be provided with bread.

Mr 'Akif said, "The Ministry of Supply, the Public Company for Automated Bakeries and the directores of supply and internal trade receive requests from sections of cities calling attention to the fact that they need these outlets. These agencies endeavor to make these stalls available, and the committees in the sections of cities make effective contributions also in these supply-related measures."

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BRIEFS

SHORTAGES BLAMED ON AUTHORITIES--Proprietors of warehouses and bakeries, merchants of vegetables and fruits, workers in cooperative stores and consumer centers and people in similar situations find themselves in a position similar to that of students in an elementary school. There is, [however], a major difference between the spontaneous innocent motivation for the conduct of those children and the aggressive, commercial objectives of the other people's conduct. When a supervisor or an inspector is in the school hall, students stop shouting; when he is not there, the level of noise is extreme. When supply agencies or inspection and supervisory authorities are not present, those people cease their practices until these agencies and authorities vanish [sic]. To state things more clearly, we find ourselves suddenly facing a bread shortage, loss of gas cylinders, or abuse and negligence by some workers in the cooperatives and consumer centers. When exploitation increases, citizens' complaints are louder. When complaints increase, responsible agencies take action. They show up; they supervise [transactions]; and the shortage begins to disappear. The clamor dies down, and the shortage disappears. One, two or three weeks go by, and matters return to their former state. The shortage becomes the rule, and abundance becomes the exception. What does all this mean? Very simply we are saying that all or most of these shortages are contrived. There is no objective justification [whatsoever] for the appearance and formation of these shortages. Consequently, they are a means for exploiting, overcharging and overburdening citizens. But what is also significant is the fact that the authorities in question are responsible for the creation of these phenomena because of their laxity. The shortages are a result of their failure to deal with these phenomena in a radical way. [Text] [Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 27 Nov 80 p 2] 8592

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

COAST GUARD APPOINTMENTS--Major Ahmad Shama Muhammad, Captain Shahin Ahmad 'Ali and Captain Muhammad 'Abdallah Mulayh have been appointed directors of the coast guard in Dubai, Ra's Al-Khaymah and Al-Sharjah respectively. [Excerpt] [Dubai KHALIJ TIMES in English 20 Dec 80 p 1]

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